BOOK REVIEW: United Front: Projecting Solidarity through Deliberation in Vietnam’s Single Party Legislature., by Paul Schuler

Nguyen, Hai Hong

doi:10.1355/cs44-1k

Cited by 2 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…In the Vietnamese context, where the party delegates executive tasks to a government cabinet led by a prime minister, Schuler (2020b) argues that demanding responsiveness when citizens' views align with regime interests is one way for the party to hold cabinet officials accountable. Incumbent politicians are motivated to be responsive to citizens' interests, not because of any concerns about elections but because regime leaders want them to be.…”

Section: Upward Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although individual delegates are prohibited from introducing new legislation, they may propose and vote on amendments during legislative debates. Many floor comments cite citizens' concerns regarding pressing issues such as food safety, health care, and infrastructure (Schuler 2020b). Although floor debates and query sessions are time limited and delegates with relevant expertise are favored for speaking time, caucuses are more freewheeling and place no limits on delegates' contributions.…”

Section: Research Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…With each new session, the share of full-time delegates has increased, and research has charted steady increases in educational attainment and professional expertise within the body (Malesky and Schuler 2011;2013;Schuler 2020b). As a result, the quality of legislative debates and query sessions has improved.…”

Section: Research Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Increasing professionalism and expertise means new responsibilities for the VNA, including public committee hearings soliciting expert testimony and annual confidence votes (Bui 2018). In fact, a majority of Vietnamese voters views legislative debates as meaningful and influential (Schuler 2020b).…”

Section: Research Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…After a rigorous nomination process to get on the ballot, voters directly elect vetted delegates through quasi-competitive elections to serve five-year terms in 184 multimember districts. Voters in each district choose multiple delegates from a slate with a roughly 2:1 candidate-to-seat ratio (Bui 2018;Schuler 2020b). The median 2016 vote share among all candidates was 60%, increasing to 72% among elected delegates.…”

Section: Electionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Can Elections Motivate Responsiveness in a Single-Party Regime? Experimental Evidence from Vietnam

2022

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A growing body of evidence attests that legislators are sometimes responsive to the policy preferences of citizens in single-party regimes, yet debate surrounds the mechanisms driving this relationship. We experimentally test two potential responsiveness mechanisms—elections versus mandates from party leaders—by provisioning delegates to the Vietnamese National Assembly with information on the policy preferences of their constituents and reminding them of either (1) the competitiveness of the upcoming 2021 elections or (2) a central decree that legislative activities should reflect constituents’ preferences. Consistent with existing work, delegates informed of citizens’ preferences are more likely to speak on the parliamentary floor and in closed-session caucuses. Importantly, we find that such responsiveness is entirely driven by election reminders; upward incentive reminders have virtually no effect on behavior.

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Section: Upward Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Research Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Research Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Research Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Electionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Can Elections Motivate Responsiveness in a Single-Party Regime? Experimental Evidence from Vietnam

2022

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Declining opportunities for speaking out: The impact of Vietnam's new leadership on grassroots collective action

Truong

2022

Asian Journal of Comparative Politics

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This article examines how Vietnam's 13th Politburo elected in 2021 affects citizens’ willingness to raise their voices about policy issues through extra-institutional channels such as protests, petitions, and social media. I argue that an exceptionally high number of public security figures in the Politburo reflected the concerns of the Communist Party's Central Committee over regime-destabilizing grassroots activism. Using an online survey experiment administered to 1500 Vietnamese citizens, which manipulates the information on the repressive nature of the public security institution and police representatives’ backgrounds, I find that a heavy police representation in the 13th Politburo makes respondents less likely to sign petitions, share their concerns on social media, and take to the streets to voice their discontent with the government. My findings suggest that single-party regimes can reverse democratic development, particularly the participation dimension, through strategic leadership arrangements.

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BOOK REVIEW: United Front: Projecting Solidarity through Deliberation in Vietnam’s Single Party Legislature., by Paul Schuler

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Can Elections Motivate Responsiveness in a Single-Party Regime? Experimental Evidence from Vietnam

Can Elections Motivate Responsiveness in a Single-Party Regime? Experimental Evidence from Vietnam

Declining opportunities for speaking out: The impact of Vietnam's new leadership on grassroots collective action

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