2022
DOI: 10.1017/s0003055422000879
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Can Elections Motivate Responsiveness in a Single-Party Regime? Experimental Evidence from Vietnam

Abstract: A growing body of evidence attests that legislators are sometimes responsive to the policy preferences of citizens in single-party regimes, yet debate surrounds the mechanisms driving this relationship. We experimentally test two potential responsiveness mechanisms—elections versus mandates from party leaders—by provisioning delegates to the Vietnamese National Assembly with information on the policy preferences of their constituents and reminding them of either (1) the competitiveness of the upcoming 2021 ele… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…The second way researchers have probed accountability experimentally is intervening on the side of political representatives. For instance, in Vietnam, elected delegates were very responsive in their policy-making efforts to receiving information about citizen preferences combined with a reminder about the competitiveness of upcoming elections (Malesky et al, 2023). The study provides evidence that even in a single-party regime, promotion incentives can motivate politicians to be accountable to citizens.…”
Section: Election Experimentsmentioning
confidence: 85%
“…The second way researchers have probed accountability experimentally is intervening on the side of political representatives. For instance, in Vietnam, elected delegates were very responsive in their policy-making efforts to receiving information about citizen preferences combined with a reminder about the competitiveness of upcoming elections (Malesky et al, 2023). The study provides evidence that even in a single-party regime, promotion incentives can motivate politicians to be accountable to citizens.…”
Section: Election Experimentsmentioning
confidence: 85%
“…The second way researchers have probed accountability experimentally is intervening on the side of political representatives. For instance, in Vietnam, elected delegates were very responsive in their policy-making efforts to receiving information about citizen preferences combined with a reminder about the competitiveness of upcoming elections (Malesky et al, 2023). The study provides evidence that even in a single-party regime, promotion incentives can motivate politicians to be accountable to citizens.…”
Section: Election Experimentsmentioning
confidence: 85%