Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents, Durable Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Abstract

Drawing on recent critiques and advances in theories of the rentier state, this paper uses an in-depth case study of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to posit a new "supply and demand" approach to the study of external rents and authoritarian durability. The Jordanian rentier state is not exclusively a product of external rents, particularly foreign aid, but also of the demands of a coalition encompassing groups with highly disparate economic policy preferences. The breadth of the Hashemite coalition requires that the regime dispense rent-fueled side payments to coalition members through constructing distributive institutions. Yet neither rent supply nor coalition demands are static. Assisted by geopolitically motivated donors, the Hashemites have adapted institutions over time to tap a diverse supply of rents that range from economic and military aid to protocol trade, allowing them to retain power through periods of late development, domestic political crisis, and neoliberal conditionality.

Pockets of Efficiency and the Rise of Iran Auto: Implications for Theories of the Developmental State

“…This work builds on the idea that strong states have greater capacity to engage in meaningful development (Soifer and vom Hau 2008) and that elite cohesion is important in the building of state capacity, whereas disunity and factionalism weaken it (Waldner 1999). This work echoes Peter Moore's comparative work on the role of elite cohesion in strengthening state capacity in Jordan and Kuwait (Moore 2001(Moore , 2004Peters and Moore 2009). He argues that elite business associations with strong ties to the state are important variables in creating coherent economic development policies.…”

Resource Governance and Developmental States in the Global South

“…Firstly, minerals, specifically oil, have been associated with instability, secrecy and unaccountable governments (Humphreys et al, 2007;Ross, 2001Ross, , 2006Ross, , 2012. This argument resonated strongly in the 1990s to explain the relative durability of authoritarian governments in the Middle East, although the extent to which it is fully applicable across the region -and much less in the developing world -has been challenged recently (Herb, 2005;Hertog, 2010a;Peters & Moore, 2009;Yom, 2011). The second argument is more time-specific and takes the view that the wave of neoliberal reforms in the developing world in the 1980s and 1990s reduced developmental space for poorer, resource-rich countries and increased already democratic deficits as a result of state-managed neoliberalism.…”

“…In Kuwait, for example, Sean Yom (2011) argues that an inclusionary strategy of building political ties with the masses precluding repressive actions enabled the state to incorporate highly mobilised classes during the pre-oil era. Even among oil-rich monarchs resisting democratisation, the breadth of efforts and political manoeuvring cannot be attributed to the simple distribution of rent-fuelled side payments but rather to the relative adaptability of elites to graft institutions responsive to economic and political pressures (Herb, 2005;Hertog, 2010aHertog, , 2010bPeters & Moore, 2009). While the resource curse can be used to explain the tendency of politicians in managing resource revenues, it inadequately reduces the complexity of political bargaining and conflicts in authoritarian regimes into apparently rational behaviour.…”

Unrequited Moderation: Credible Commitments and State Repression in Egypt

“…Comparativists studying the Middle East have argued that the region's regimes have retained power by preventing elite divisions, repressing the opposition, and exploiting foreign sources of rent (Bellin 2004;Heydemann 2007;Peters and Moore 2009;Pripstein-Posusney and Angrist 2005;Yom 2009). Applying this literature to the Algerian case, democracy proponents in Algeria were doubly challenged during 1988-1992.…”