Unrequited Moderation: Credible Commitments and State Repression in Egypt

Abstract

In strategic accounts of democratization, credible commitments by the opposition shape whether incumbents will relinquish power. Revisiting Kalyvas's study of Algeria and Belgium, this article introduces evidence from Egypt that shows the structural readiness of incumbents remains as consequential as commitment credibility. During the period 1990-2008 the credibility of democratic commitments by the Egyptian opposition improved along the lines identified by Kalyvas. Unlike its Algerian counterpart, the Islamic movement in Egypt was able to "silence the radicals" and, after 1998, emit a non-dissonant message of electoral participation without militia violence. This improvement in commitment credibility was not reciprocated by Egyptian elites, who enjoyed western support and a sturdy repressive apparatus. Similar factors obstructed the Algerian opposition and they indicate a more disciplined, less dissonant Islamic party would have been unlikely to effect a democratic transition. Transitions are most likely when a credibly committed opposition faces an elite ready to rotate power. The second factor helps explain the success of the Catholic party in Belgium and the failure of comparable Islamic movements in North Africa.

From the Arab Spring to the Chinese Winter: The institutional sources of authoritarian vulnerability and resilience in Egypt, Tunisia, and China

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Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis

“…30 on the credible commitments of Islamists, see Brownlee 2010. the eye of the beholder, so the burden is not entirely on the messenger. nevertheless, comparisons between the experiences of Islamist parties and those of Christian parties and socialist parties do demonstrate that moderation may have little to do with religion and everything to do with historical power struggles and local contexts.…”

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“…When Sadat came to power in 1970, the government applied a policy of permissiveness, easing repressive measures applied by President Nasser. This policy turned into mass repression over the following decade until Sadat’s assassination in 1981 and beyond (Ansari 1987; Brownlee 2010; Hafez 2003, 84). In this climate, both violent and nonviolent forms of dissent co-existed.…”