Bernard Williams and the possibility of a realist political theory

Sleat

2014

SSRN Journal

This paper provides a critical overview of the realist current in contemporary political philosophy. We define political realism on the basis of its attempt to give varying degrees of autonomy to politics as a sphere of human activity, in large part through its exploration of the sources of normativity appropriate for the political, and so distinguish sharply between political realism and non-ideal theory. We then identify and discuss four key arguments advanced by political realists: from ideology, from the relationship of ethics to politics, from the priority of legitimacy over justice, and from the nature of political judgment. Next, we ask to what extent realism is a methodological approach as opposed to a substantive political position, and so discuss the relationship between realism and a few such positions. We close by pointing out the links between contemporary realism and the realist strand that runs through much of the history of Western political thought.Much contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy operates as a branch of applied ethics: normative political theory is supposed to implement moral commitments external to politics, be they teleological ideals or deontological constraints. However in recent years-under the loose label of 'political realism'-an alternative approach has emerged, or perhaps reemerged (Galston 2010; Runciman 2012). Crudely, realists maintain that political philosophy should not seek to regiment politics through morality; rather, it should theorise about the distinctive forces that shape real politics. Critics of realism see this move as a capitulation of normative theory in favour of descriptive approaches to politics. Realists see it as a way to make political philosophy more relevant and less ideological.This article has two main objectives and as many main sections. First, we propose a working definition of realism, and a critical overview of what we take to be the four key arguments in favour of that position. Second, we explore the status of realist theory: is it best characterised as a series of methodological concerns or does it represent a substantive political position it is own right? In the brief conclusion we discuss to what extent realism is (or could be) a new development rather than a revival of a traditional current of political thinking.

Section: Realist Themesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Realist Themesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Realism in Normative Political Theory

Sleat

2014

SSRN Journal

“…That response elicits at least two separate rejoinders. On the one hand, some realists (Sangiovanni 2008, Sleat 2010 have put forward an interpretation of Rawls' later work that highlights its more context-and practice-sensitive aspects; but it also seems fair to say that much of mainstream political philosophy has not followed in the footsteps of what some have seen as Rawls' departure from moralism (in fact that aspect has attracted much criticism from Rawls' own followers -cf., for example, Scheffler 1994). On the other hand, the political-comprehensive distinction has been subjected to a number of powerful criticisms (e.g.…”

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confidence: 99%

Justice, legitimacy and (normative) authority for political realists

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosoph

2012

One of the main challenges faced by realists in political philosophy is that of offering an account of authority that is genuinely normative and yet does not consist of a moralistic application of general, abstract ethical principles to the practice of politics. Political moralists typically start by devising a conception of justice based on their pre-political moral commitments; authority would then be legitimate only if political power is exercised in accordance with justice. As an alternative to that dominant approach I put forward the idea that upturning the relationship between justice and legitimacy affords a normative notion of authority that does not depend on a pre-political account of morality, and thus avoids some serious problems faced by mainstream theories of justice. I then argue that the appropriate purpose of justice is simply to specify the implementation of an independently-grounded conception of legitimacy, which in turn rests on a context-and practice-sensitive understanding of the purpose of political power.

“…Galston (2010) and Sleat (2010) also pointed out the search for agreement in Williams' realism. 21 .…”

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confidence: 99%

“…24 . Though it has been argued that this brings realists too close to idealism (Sleat 2010, Gledhill 2011 . Rawls famously pointed out how pluralism, reasonable and otherwise, is the inevitable product of life under free institutions.…”

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confidence: 99%

Consensus, compromise, justice and legitimacy

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosoph

2013

Could the notion of compromise help us overcoming -or at least negotiatingthe frequent tension, in normative political theory, between the realistic desideratum of peaceful coexistence and the idealistic desideratum of justice? That is to say, an analysis of compromise may help us moving beyond the contrast between two widespread contrasting attitudes in contemporary political philosophy: 'fiat iustitia, pereat mundus' on the one side, 'salus populi suprema lex' on the other side. More specifically, compromise may provide the backbone of a conception of legitimacy that mediates between idealistic (or moralistic) and realistic (or pragmatic) desiderata of political theory, i.e. between the aspiration to peace and the aspiration to justice. In other words, this paper considers whether an account of compromise could feature in a viable realistic conception of political legitimacy, in much the same way in which consensus features in more idealistic conceptions of legitimacy (a move that may be attributed to some realist theorists, especially Bernard Williams). My conclusions, however, are largely sceptical: I argue that grounding legitimacy in any kind of normatively salient agreement does require the trappings of idealistic political philosophy, for better or -in my view -worse.