Beneficial laggards: multilevel selection, cooperative polymorphism and division of labour in threshold public good games

Boza, Gergely; Számadó, Szabolcs

doi:10.1186/1471-2148-10-336

Cited by 54 publications

(59 citation statements)

References 86 publications

(131 reference statements)

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“…We note the parallel between this work and our model of cooperation over care. However, in contrast to the multilevel selection approach taken by Michod (2006) and a recent game-theoretic analysis of social role specialization (Boza and Számadó 2010), we show that social role specialization can promote the evolution of cooperation without the need to invoke grouplevel competition. We therefore propose the general hypotheses that synergistic costs and skill differences between two or more cooperative traits should confer a selective advantage to specialization, which in turn stabilizes cooperation over evolutionary time.…”

Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 89%

Social Role Specialization Promotes Cooperation between Parents

Barta

Székely²,

Liker³

et al. 2014

The American Naturalist

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JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. abstract: Biparental care of offspring is a widespread social behavior, and various ecological, life-history, and demographic factors have been proposed to explain its evolution and maintenance. Raising offspring generally requires several types of care (e.g., feeding, brooding, and defense), and males and females often specialize in providing different types of care. However, theoretical models of care often assume that care is a single variable and hence that a unit of care by the mother is interchangeable with a unit of care by the father. We hypothesize that the ability of one parent to provide all types of care may be limited by nonadditive costs or by sex-based asymmetries in the costs of particular care types. Using an individual-based simulation, we show that synergistic costs of investing in two tasks or negligible sex-based cost asymmetries select for task specialization and biparental care. Biparental care persists despite intense sexual selection and sex-biased mortality, suggesting that previous models make overly restrictive predictions of the conditions under which cooperation can be maintained. Our model provides a mechanistic underpinning for published models that show that the synergistic benefits of individuals cooperating can stabilize cooperation, both in the context of parental care and in other social scenarios.

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Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 89%

Social Role Specialization Promotes Cooperation between Parents

Barta

Székely²,

Liker³

et al. 2014

The American Naturalist

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“…In fig. 1 (a), it is clearly shown that the cooperation level ρ c monotonously increases with the enhancement factor r for each value of h [16]. Interestingly, compared with other cases, the one with h = 0.4 leads to the optimal cooperation level [see fig.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…While the prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) has become a paradigm for studying the evolution of cooperation among individuals through pairwise interactions [1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]. As a natural extension, the N-person PDG, namely, the public goods game (PGG) for collective interactions also attracts much attention [10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20]. In a typical PGG, each player in a group of N individuals is entitled to adopt either cooperation (C) or defection (D).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reputation-based mutual selection rule promotes cooperation in spatial threshold public goods games

Wang

Chen

Gao

et al. 2013

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

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Most previous studies involving public goods games are investigated under a simplifying assumption that participation is either compulsive or unidirectional optional in collective interactions. Nevertheless, how the mutual selection rule, a more realistic participation mode, affects the evolution of cooperation in structured populations is still unclear. Here we introduce a reputation-based mutual selection rule for constituting participant groups into spatial threshold public goods games, where the public goods game can be conducted only if the participant number is not less than the threshold parameter. Interestingly, we find that moderate tolerance range results in the best environment for cooperators' viability. Also, we show that lower member threshold is favorable for the evolution of cooperation, and correspondingly provide some typical snapshots for defectors, "active" cooperators (cooperators on which the public goods games are successfully conducted), and "inactive" cooperators. Moreover, we investigate the effects of memory factor in individuals' reputation updating on the evolution of cooperation. Our work may provide an appropriate and alternative perspective in understanding the widespread cooperative behaviors in some realistic situations.

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“…However, frequency-dependent game theoretical models have explored the evolutionary stability of mixes of cheating and cooperative strategies in groups of non-relatives (e.g. [19,20]). These models assume that freeriders do well when they are rare because they exploit the efforts of a large number of cooperators.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cheating and punishment in cooperative animal societies

Riehl

Frederickson

2016

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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Cheaters—genotypes that gain a selective advantage by taking the benefits of the social contributions of others while avoiding the costs of cooperating—are thought to pose a major threat to the evolutionary stability of cooperative societies. In order for cheaters to undermine cooperation, cheating must be an adaptive strategy: cheaters must have higher fitness than cooperators, and their behaviour must reduce the fitness of their cooperative partners. It is frequently suggested that cheating is not adaptive because cooperators have evolved mechanisms to punish these behaviours, thereby reducing the fitness of selfish individuals. However, a simpler hypothesis is that such societies arise precisely because cooperative strategies have been favoured over selfish ones—hence, behaviours that have been interpreted as ‘cheating’ may not actually result in increased fitness, even when they go unpunished. Here, we review the empirical evidence for cheating behaviours in animal societies, including cooperatively breeding vertebrates and social insects, and we ask whether such behaviours are primarily limited by punishment. Our review suggests that both cheating and punishment are probably rarer than often supposed. Uncooperative individuals typically have lower, not higher, fitness than cooperators; and when evidence suggests that cheating may be adaptive, it is often limited by frequency-dependent selection rather than by punishment. When apparently punitive behaviours do occur, it remains an open question whether they evolved in order to limit cheating, or whether they arose before the evolution of cooperation.

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Beneficial laggards: multilevel selection, cooperative polymorphism and division of labour in threshold public good games

Cited by 54 publications

References 86 publications

Social Role Specialization Promotes Cooperation between Parents

Social Role Specialization Promotes Cooperation between Parents

Reputation-based mutual selection rule promotes cooperation in spatial threshold public goods games

Cheating and punishment in cooperative animal societies

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