Correlation between gut microbiota and host phylogeny could reflect codiversification over shared evolutionary history or a selective environment that is more similar in related hosts. These alternatives imply substantial differences in the relationship between host and symbiont, but can they be distinguished based on patterns in the community data themselves? We explored patterns of phylogenetic correlation in the distribution of gut bacteria among species of turtle ants (genus Cephalotes), which host a dense gut microbial community. We used 16S rRNA pyrosequencing from 25 Cephalotes species to show that their gut community is remarkably stable, from the colony to the genus level. Despite this overall similarity, the existing differences among species' microbiota significantly correlated with host phylogeny. We introduced a novel analytical technique to test whether these phylogenetic correlations are derived from recent bacterial evolution, as would be expected in the case of codiversification, or from broader shifts more likely to reflect environmental filters imposed by factors such as diet or habitat. We also tested this technique on a published data set of ape microbiota, confirming earlier results while revealing previously undescribed patterns of phylogenetic correlation. Our results indicated a high degree of partner fidelity in the Cephalotes microbiota, suggesting that vertical transmission of the entire community could play an important role in the evolution and maintenance of the association. As additional comparative microbiota data become available, the techniques presented here can be used to explore trends in the evolution of host-associated microbial communities.

Cheating is a focal concept in the study of mutualism, with the majority of researchers considering cheating to be both prevalent and highly damaging. However, current definitions of cheating do not reliably capture the evolutionary threat that has been a central motivation for the study of cheating. We describe the development of the cheating concept and distill a relative-fitness-based definition of cheating that encapsulates the evolutionary threat posed by cheating, i.e. that cheaters will spread and erode the benefits of mutualism. We then describe experiments required to conclude that cheating is occurring and to quantify fitness conflict more generally. Next, we discuss how our definition and methods can generate comparability and integration of theory and experiments, which are currently divided by their respective prioritisations of fitness consequences and traits. To evaluate the current empirical evidence for cheating, we review the literature on several of the best-studied mutualisms. We find that although there are numerous observations of low-quality partners, there is currently very little support from fitness data that any of these meet our criteria to be considered cheaters. Finally, we highlight future directions for research on conflict in mutualisms, including novel research avenues opened by a relative-fitness-based definition of cheating.

We review recent work at the interface of economic game theory and evolutionary biology that provides new insights into the evolution of partner choice, host sanctions, partner fidelity feedback and public goods. (1) The theory of games with asymmetrical information shows that the right incentives allow hosts to screen-out parasites and screen-in mutualists, explaining successful partner choice in the absence of signalling. Applications range from ant-plants to microbiomes. (2) Contract theory distinguishes two longstanding but weakly differentiated explanations of host response to defectors: host sanctions and partner fidelity feedback. Host traits that selectively punish misbehaving symbionts are parsimoniously interpreted as pre-adaptations. Yucca-moth and legume-rhizobia mutualisms are argued to be examples of partner fidelity feedback. (3) The theory of public goods shows that cooperation in multi-player interactions can evolve in the absence of assortment, in one-shot social dilemmas among non-kin. Applications include alarm calls in vertebrates and exoenzymes in microbes.

How cooperation originates and persists in diverse species, from bacteria to multicellular organisms to human societies, is a major question in evolutionary biology. A large literature asks: what prevents selection for cheating within cooperative lineages? In mutualisms, or cooperative interactions between species, feedback between partners often aligns their fitness interests, such that cooperative symbionts receive more benefits from their hosts than uncooperative symbionts. But how do these feedbacks evolve? Cheaters might invade symbiont populations and select for hosts that preferentially reward or associate with cooperators (often termed sanctions or partner choice); hosts might adapt to variation in symbiont quality that does not amount to cheating (e.g., environmental variation); or conditional host responses might exist before cheaters do, making mutualisms stable from the outset. I review evidence from yucca-yucca moth, fig-fig wasp, and legume-rhizobium mutualisms, which are commonly cited as mutualisms stabilized by sanctions. Based on the empirical evidence, it is doubtful that cheaters select for host sanctions in these systems; cheaters are too uncommon. Recognizing that sanctions likely evolved for functions other than retaliation against cheaters offers many insights about mutualism coevolution, and about why mutualism evolves in only some lineages of potential hosts.

Although mutualisms are common in all ecological communities and have played key roles in the diversification of life, our current understanding of the evolution of cooperation applies mostly to social behavior within a species. A central question is whether mutualisms persist because hosts have evolved costly punishment of cheaters. Here, we use the economic theory of employment contracts to formulate and distinguish between two mechanisms that have been proposed to prevent cheating in host-symbiont mutualisms, partner fidelity feedback (PFF) and host sanctions (HS). Under PFF, positive feedback between host fitness and symbiont fitness is sufficient to prevent cheating; in contrast, HS posits the necessity of costly punishment to maintain mutualism. A coevolutionary model of mutualism finds that HS are unlikely to evolve de novo, and published data on legume-rhizobia and yucca-moth mutualisms are consistent with PFF and not with HS. Thus, in systems considered to be textbook cases of HS, we find poor support for the theory that hosts have evolved to punish cheating symbionts; instead, we show that even horizontally transmitted mutualisms can be stabilized via PFF. PFF theory may place previously underappreciated constraints on the evolution of mutualism and explain why punishment is far from ubiquitous in nature.evolution of cooperation | punishment | symbiosis | partner fidelity feedback | host sanctions