“…This puzzle also plausibly applies to Noggle's (2016) proposal that obsessive thoughts are “quasi‐beliefs” 13 . Call this proposal quasi‐belief thesis: Quasi‐belief thesis : The obsessive thoughts at which insight is directed take the form of quasi‐beliefs.…”
Section: The Puzzlementioning
confidence: 88%
“…This sort of puzzling combination of thoughts and behaviors is familiar from other so‐called discordancy cases , such as those involving phobias, superstition, implicit attitudes, and so forth 2 . Noggle (2016) has recently discussed the discordant nature of OCD with good insight, observing that it is not clear how to attribute beliefs in these cases, given that “persons with OCD may not only disavow the propositions which appear to generate their anxiety and compulsive behavior, but they may also fail to employ them in their practical and theoretical reasoning” (p. 655). In some ways, the compulsive hand‐washer thinks and behaves like someone who believes that her hands are contaminated, but in other ways, she does not.…”
This article discusses a puzzle arising from the phenomenon of insight in obsessive–compulsive disorder. “Insight” refers to an awareness or understanding of obsessive thoughts as false or irrational. I argue that a natural and plausible way of characterizing insight in OCD conflicts with several different possible explanations of the epistemic attitude underlying insight‐directed obsessive thought. After laying out the puzzle for five proposed explanations of obsessive thought and then discussing several possible ways that the puzzle might be avoided, I close the article by arguing that we can avoid the puzzle by adopting a new positive view of insight‐directed obsessive thought.
“…This puzzle also plausibly applies to Noggle's (2016) proposal that obsessive thoughts are “quasi‐beliefs” 13 . Call this proposal quasi‐belief thesis: Quasi‐belief thesis : The obsessive thoughts at which insight is directed take the form of quasi‐beliefs.…”
Section: The Puzzlementioning
confidence: 88%
“…This sort of puzzling combination of thoughts and behaviors is familiar from other so‐called discordancy cases , such as those involving phobias, superstition, implicit attitudes, and so forth 2 . Noggle (2016) has recently discussed the discordant nature of OCD with good insight, observing that it is not clear how to attribute beliefs in these cases, given that “persons with OCD may not only disavow the propositions which appear to generate their anxiety and compulsive behavior, but they may also fail to employ them in their practical and theoretical reasoning” (p. 655). In some ways, the compulsive hand‐washer thinks and behaves like someone who believes that her hands are contaminated, but in other ways, she does not.…”
This article discusses a puzzle arising from the phenomenon of insight in obsessive–compulsive disorder. “Insight” refers to an awareness or understanding of obsessive thoughts as false or irrational. I argue that a natural and plausible way of characterizing insight in OCD conflicts with several different possible explanations of the epistemic attitude underlying insight‐directed obsessive thought. After laying out the puzzle for five proposed explanations of obsessive thought and then discussing several possible ways that the puzzle might be avoided, I close the article by arguing that we can avoid the puzzle by adopting a new positive view of insight‐directed obsessive thought.
“…6 Um caso anterior e bastante influente que mereceria análise detida é a proposta de 'desejos de segunda ordem' exposta paradigmaticamente por Harry Frankfurt em "Freedom of the will and the concept of a person," Journal of Philosophy, n.68: p.5-20, 1971. Para outros três exemplos recentes da mesma tendência: Andy Egan (2009) introduz, no contexto da discussão sobre delírios, o conceito de 'bimagination' -estados híbridos com características da crença e da imaginação; Noggle (2016) desenvolveu o conceito de 'quasi-belief'para analisar casos de TOC e Frankish (2004) operacionalizou a distinção entre 'crenças básica's e 'super-crenças' para tratar da 'akrasia' e dos delírios. menos de tudo ou nada.…”
Resumo: O artigo argumenta por um paralelismo entre o surgimento de teorias híbridas na Metaética e novas propostas de categorização para estados mentais que tomam como base conceitos da folk psychology. São discutidos três propostas de teorias híbridas (Copp 2001, Boisvert 2008 e Kriegel 2012 e três propostas de categorizações (besires, aliefs e in-between beliefs). Esse paralelo não é acidental, antes indica uma direção profícua para a solução do confronto entre cognitivismo e não cognitivismo, desde que as novas categorizações propostas estejam integradas em teorias da psicologia ou neurociências que apresentem suporte de evidência empírica. Palavras-chave: Folk psychology; cognitivismo; não cognitivism.
Abstract:The paper argues for a parallelism between the emergence of hybrid theories in metaethics and new proposals of categorization for mental states build upon folk psychology concepts. Three samples of hybrid approaches (Copp 2001, Boisvert 2008and Kriegel 2012 and categorizations (besires, aliefs, and in-between beliefs) are discussed. This parallelism is not accidental, but rather indicates a useful direction for the solution of cognitivism versus non-cognitivism debate, provided that the proposed categorizations could be integrated into psychological or neuroscientific theories supported by empirical evidence. Keywords: Folk psychology; cognitivism; non-cognitivism.
IntroduçãoEm consequência dos esforços de Simon Blackburn e Allan Gibbard na direção de uma teoria quase-realista em Metaética, a tradicional divisão entre cognitivistas e não cognitivistas deixou de ser prioritariamente feita a partir da atribuição ou não de valor-de-verdade para os juízos morais e passou a ser traçada perguntando-se que tipo de estado mental constitui ou é expresso por esses juízos. Portanto, pressupondo uma fronteira entre estados conativos (destacados pelos não cognitivistas) e estados doxásticos (sublinhados pelos cognitivistas) 1 .Em sintonia com essa pressuposição, o programa expressivista pode ser minimamente caracterizado, resguardando especificidades, como uma tese 1 Esse ponto aparece claramente em HAROLD 2012, p.166.
“…For example, doxastic attitudes might include aliefs (Gendler, ), in‐between beliefs (Schwitzgebel, ), or quasi‐beliefs (Noggle, ). Each of these attitudes could be ingredients of epistemic akrasia.…”
Epistemic akrasia is the phenomenon of voluntarily believing what you think you should not. Whether epistemic akrasia is possible is a matter of controversy. I argue that at least some people who suffer from obsessivecompulsive disorder are genuinely epistemically akratic. I advance an account of epistemic akrasia that explains the clinical data and provides broader insight into the nature of doxastic attitude-formation.
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