Discordant knowing: A puzzle about insight in obsessive–compulsive disorder

Taylor, Evan Muir

doi:10.1111/mila.12301

Cited by 5 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…For example, when stepping on to the Grand Canyon Skywalk, I might be disposed to think of and feel afraid of falling, even while believing that the walkway is safe, in which case I can be said to “alieve” that it is not safe. As Taylor (2022) notes, this is compatible with knowing that the walkway is safe. Similarly, if imagining is simply a matter of having a mental image or representation of some scenario or proposition, then imagining p is also compatible with knowing that p is false.…”

Section: The False Belief Modelmentioning

confidence: 87%

“…This kind of defeat is known as "doxastic defeat" (Lackey, 1999). For a recent explanation, see also Taylor (2022).…”

Section: An Behavior Without False Beliefsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But how is such insight possible if the insight targets a belief of one's own? We will bring this question into sharper focus by drawing on an analogous puzzle about insight in obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) recently described by Taylor (2022) and further discussed in our own previous work, which we adapt to AN below (Steglich-Petersen & Varga, 2022).…”

Section: A Puzzle About Insightmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This kind of defeat is known as "doxastic defeat"(Lackey, 1999). For a recent explanation, see alsoTaylor (2022).7 Gadsby (2017b) notes the heterogeneity amongst AN patients, and that many do not hold the relevant false beliefs about their body size. Consequently, he embraces a "piecemeal approach" and maintains that in the population that harbors these false beliefs, understanding how they arise will help solve a piece of the puzzle.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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On the roles of false belief and recalcitrant fear in anorexia nervosa

Varga

Steglich‐Petersen

2023

Mind & Language

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The DSM-5 highlights two essential psychological features of anorexia nervosa (AN): recalcitrant fear of gaining weight and body image disturbance. Prominent accounts grant false beliefs about body weight and shape a central role in the explanation of AN behavior. In this article, we propose a stronger emphasis on recalcitrant fear. We show that such fear can explain AN behavior without the intermediary of a false belief, and thus without the associated explanatory burdens and conceptual difficulties. We illustrate how shifting the emphasis from false belief to recalcitrant fear can supplement a number of different non-doxastic models of AN.

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Section: The False Belief Modelmentioning

confidence: 87%

“…This kind of defeat is known as "doxastic defeat" (Lackey, 1999). For a recent explanation, see also Taylor (2022).…”

Section: An Behavior Without False Beliefsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Puzzle About Insightmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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On the roles of false belief and recalcitrant fear in anorexia nervosa

Varga

Steglich‐Petersen

2023

Mind & Language

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“…In this paper, we challenge this common assumption and propose an alternative. Our challenge builds on a recent puzzle posed by Evan Taylor (2022), arising from the common phenomenon of insight into one's own OCD. Insight can take two forms: "world-directed insight" in the form of knowledge that one's own obsessive thoughts are false; and "selfdirected insight" in the form of knowledge that one's own obsessive thoughts are irrational.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Obsessive-compulsive disorder and recalcitrant emotion: relocating the seat of irrationality

Steglich‐Petersen

Varga

2022

Philosophical Psychology

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It is widely agreed that obsessive-compulsive disorder involves irrationality. But where in the complex of states and processes that constitutes OCD should this irrationality be located? A pervasive assumption in both the psychiatric and philosophical literature is that the seat of irrationality is located in the obsessive thoughts characteristic of OCD. Building on a puzzle about insight into OCD (Taylor 2022), we challenge this pervasive assumption, and argue instead that the irrationality of OCD is located in the emotions that are characteristic of OCD, such as anxiety or fear. In particular, we propose to understand the irrationality of OCD as a matter of harboring recalcitrant emotions. We argue that this account not only solves the puzzle about insight, but also makes better sense of how OCD sufferers experience and describe their condition and helps explain some otherwise puzzling features of compulsive behavior.

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Everyday anxious doubt

Vazard

2022

Synthese

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In this article I examine the role of anxiety in our motivation to reassess our epistemic states, by taking as a starting point a proposal put forward by Levy (Philosophers' Imprint 16:1–10, 2016), according to which anxiety is responsible for the ruminations and worries about threatening possibilities that we sometimes get caught up into in our everyday life. Levy’s claim is that these irrational persistent thoughts about possible states of affairs are best explained by anxiety, rather than by beliefs, degrees of belief, or other mental states. I will take Levy’s article as a starting point into my study of the role of anxiety in our inclinations to question the epistemic quality of our cognitive states. While I believe that Levy is right in directing our attention to the role of anxiety in these cases, his claim calls for further explanation into the nature of anxiety, and into the mechanisms through which anxiety generates these doubts. Although the relation between anxiety and doubt has already been highlighted (Hookway in: Can J Philos 28:203–225, 1998, Epistemology and emotions, Ashgate Publishing, Hampshire, 2008), there has been little effort to elaborate on the mechanisms through which an affective state like anxiety generates a motivation to reassess our beliefs. This paper is an attempt at providing such an elaboration. Clarifying the role of anxiety in these phenomena will lead me to revise a common assumption about the interactions between anxiety and higher-level cognitive processes, such as the ones involved in representing hypothetical threatening scenarios through mental imagery.

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Discordant knowing: A puzzle about insight in obsessive–compulsive disorder

Cited by 5 publications

References 33 publications

On the roles of false belief and recalcitrant fear in anorexia nervosa

On the roles of false belief and recalcitrant fear in anorexia nervosa

Obsessive-compulsive disorder and recalcitrant emotion: relocating the seat of irrationality

Everyday anxious doubt

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