Barriers to Bioweapons: Intangible Obstacles to Proliferation

Abstract

Although the issue of knowledge diffusion has been at the heart of nonproliferation research and policies, no study in the political science field has thus far systematically identified the mechanisms that allow the acquisition and efficient use of specialized knowledge related to bioweapons. This analytical gap has led to the commonly held belief that bioweapons knowledge is easily transferable. Studies of past weapons programs, including the former U.S. and Soviet bioweapons programs, show that gathering the relevant information and expertise required to produce a weapon is not sufficient to guarantee success. The success of a bioweapons program is dependent on intangible factors, such as work organization, program management, structural organization, and social environment, which can enhance the advancement of a program or create obstacles to progress. When assessed within smaller state and terrorist bioweapons programs, such as those of South Africa and the terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo, these intangible factors produce the same constraining effects as in larger programs. More important, intangible factors have a significant effect on covert programs, because clandestinity imposes greater restrictions on knowledge diffusion. By taking into account these intangible factors, analysts and policymakers can improve their threat assessments and develop more effective nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies.

Negotiating the dynamics of uncomfortable knowledge: The case of dual use and synthetic biology

“…The importance of tacit knowledge is frequently overlooked in the dominant narrative of the dual use threat associated with advanced biosciences, where the focus tends to be on access to biological materials and published research, rather than on human practices and institutional dimensions. We argue, together with Vogel and Ben Ouagrham-Gormley ( Ben Ouagrham-Gormley and Vogel, 2010 ; Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, 2012 ; Vogel, 2013 ), as well as Revill and Jefferson (2013) , that recognising the importance of tacit knowledge is crucial for more sophisticated assessments of biosecurity threats. Yet this remains an unknown known.…”

“…This body of knowledge goes beyond the issue of tacit knowledge and points to the need for the alignment of particular organisational structures, processes and practices in the production of technology. Vogel and Ben Ouagrham-Gormley have documented in-depth how these factors have constrained bioweapons programmes in the United States, Soviet Union and Iraq ( Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, 2012 ; Vogel, 2013 ; Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, 2014 ). Specific local organisational structures and divisions of labour have to be developed for every stage of the bioweapons process, from research, to development, to small-scale production, large-scale production, testing and weaponisation.…”

Revolution versus evolution?: Understanding scientific and technological diffusion in synthetic biology and their implications for biosecurity policies

“…Recent longitudinal case studies (spanning 20-30 years) that examine a range of biotechnologies find that scientists have encountered significant challenges in moving down the development chain to more applied purposes (Horrobin, 2001;Hedgecoe and Martin, 2003;Horrobin, 2003;Nightingale and Martin, 2004;Joppi et al, 2005;Hopkins et al, 2006;Pisano, 2006;Hopkins et al, 2007). This is because significant bottlenecks have been found to emerge along the biotech development path that include both technical (for example, complexity of biological systems) and socio-organizational components that can constrain and structure the adoption of a new technology, often taking several decades to resolve (Nightingale, 2004;Nightingale and Martin, 2004;McLeish, 2006;Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, 2012). Interestingly, solutions to many of these bottlenecks have been largely unaffected by advances in biotechnology.…”

Dissuading Biological Weapons Proliferation

“…The additional scientists provided the much-needed skills and tacit knowledge missing from the documents, and the work eventually succeeded, but only after three more years of adaptation of the technology to the new site. 75 Finally, the use of scientific documents is also dependent on their users' absorptive capacity, which assumes that scientists possess an appropriate base knowledge at the start, allowing them to interpret written documents and make judgements on how best to use them. 76 Without such knowledge, the learning curve might be too steep to achieve success, particularly if these individuals cannot work in close cooperation 486 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY with the documents' authors.…”