This article explores the practices behind the creation and transfer of knowledge related to biological weapons (BW) in the former Soviet BW program and their implications for understanding bioweapons proliferation. Using in-depth interviews collected for an ongoing oral history project of the Soviet and U.S. bioweapons programs, this article shows that BW proliferation is a complex issue that involves thus far unrecognized social factors that can shape the production and proliferation of bioweapons knowledge. The article highlights (1) the local and personal character of bioweapons knowledge, specialized skills, and scientific know-how, which cannot be transferred easily from one person to another and from one location to another; (2) the importance of organization and management style in creating certain types of knowledge and skills and allowing or preventing the transfer of those skills to occur within and outside an organization; and (3) the differences that exist among various groups of former Soviet BW facilities in their ability to efficiently transfer bioweapons knowledge and laboratory skills. The article concludes with a discussion on the policy implications of these findings and provides guidance for constructing and implementing a more consistent and rigorous set of targeted nonproliferation interventions to address facility-specific "brain-drain" threats involving former bioweaponeers.
Although the issue of knowledge diffusion has been at the heart of nonproliferation research and policies, no study in the political science field has thus far systematically identified the mechanisms that allow the acquisition and efficient use of specialized knowledge related to bioweapons. This analytical gap has led to the commonly held belief that bioweapons knowledge is easily transferable. Studies of past weapons programs, including the former U.S. and Soviet bioweapons programs, show that gathering the relevant information and expertise required to produce a weapon is not sufficient to guarantee success. The success of a bioweapons program is dependent on intangible factors, such as work organization, program management, structural organization, and social environment, which can enhance the advancement of a program or create obstacles to progress. When assessed within smaller state and terrorist bioweapons programs, such as those of South Africa and the terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo, these intangible factors produce the same constraining effects as in larger programs. More important, intangible factors have a significant effect on covert programs, because clandestinity imposes greater restrictions on knowledge diffusion. By taking into account these intangible factors, analysts and policymakers can improve their threat assessments and develop more effective nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies.
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