Autonomy and Personal Integration

Ekstrom, Laura W.

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511614194.007

Cited by 82 publications

(35 citation statements)

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“…Authenticity describes behavior “really proceeding from its reputed author.” Authentic actions are those for which one takes responsibility; they are not half‐hearted or disowned. Ekstrom (2005) and Kernis and Goldman (2005) similarly stress that authentic or autonomous acts proceed from one's core self, representing those preferences and values that are wholeheartedly endorsed.…”

Section: Defining Autonomy: a Brief Philosophical Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self‐Regulation and the Problem of Human Autonomy: Does Psychology Need Choice, Self‐Determination, and Will?

Ryan

Deci

2006

Journal of Personality

1,154

784

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The term autonomy literally refers to regulation by the self. Its opposite, heteronomy, refers to controlled regulation, or regulation that occurs without self-endorsement. At a time when philosophers and economists are increasingly detailing the nature of autonomy and recognizing its social and practical significance, many psychologists are questioning the reality and import of autonomy and closely related phenomena such as will, choice, and freedom. Using the framework of self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000), we review research concerning the benefits of autonomous versus controlled regulation for goal performance, persistence, affective experience, quality of relationships, and well-being across domains and cultures. We also address some of the controversies and terminological issues surrounding the construct of autonomy, including critiques of autonomy by biological reductionists, cultural relativists, and behaviorists. We conclude that there is a universal and cross-developmental value to autonomous regulation when the construct is understood in an exacting way.

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Section: Defining Autonomy: a Brief Philosophical Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self‐Regulation and the Problem of Human Autonomy: Does Psychology Need Choice, Self‐Determination, and Will?

Ryan

Deci

2006

Journal of Personality

1,154

784

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“…This requires our policy to reference a compelling account of authenticity e.g. one based on volitional necessities (Frankfurt 1982;1998;Watson 2004) or coherence of preferences (Ekstrom 1993;2005a;2005b;2010). To illustrate, we might design a choice prompt that asks choosers to consider what outcomes they feel that they could not live without or how their decision will compare to those that they usually make.…”

Section: The Salient Characteristics Of Choice Architecturementioning

confidence: 99%

The Heteronomy of Choice Architecture

Mills

2015

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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A note on versions:The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher's version. Please see the 'permanent WRAP url' above for details on accessing the published version and note that access may require a subscription. The Heteronomy of Choice ArchitectureReview of Philosophy and Psychology 6, no. 3 (2015): 495-509. AbstractChoice architecture is heralded as a policy approach that does not coercively reduce freedom of choice. Still we might worry that this approach fails to respect individual choice because it subversively manipulates individuals, thus contravening their personal autonomy. In this article I address two arguments to this effect. First, I deny that choice architecture is necessarily heteronomous. I explain the reasons we have for avoiding heteronomous policy-making and offer a set of four conditions for non-heteronomy. I then provide examples of nudges that meet these conditions. I argue that these policies are capable of respecting and promoting personal autonomy, and show this claim to be true across contrasting conceptions of autonomy. Second, I deny that choice architecture is disrespectful because it is epistemically paternalistic. This critique appears to loom large even against non-heteronomous nudges. However, I argue that while some of these policies may exhibit epistemically paternalistic tendencies, these tendencies do not necessarily undermine personal autonomy. Thus, if we are to find such policies objectionable, we cannot do so on the grounds of respect for autonomy.

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“…If we do this, we can construct promising models of cognitive agency. The first model is what I call the Structuralist model of belief ownership, which is analogous to Laura Ekstrom's (, 2005a and 2005b) account of desire ownership and autonomy…”

Section: Cognitive Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ekstrom herself adds this structural requirement to her account, because she thinks that ‘cohering attitudes’ or ‘integrated preferences’ mutually support each other and so constitute moral character . She has four reasons for thinking this (2005a, pp. 154–155).…”

Section: Cognitive Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Knowledge, Credit, and Cognitive Agency

Breyer

2013

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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According to credit theories of knowledge, S knows that p only if S deserves credit for truly believing that p. This article argues that any adequate credit theory has to explain the conditions under which beliefs are attributable to subjects. It then presents a general account of these conditions and defends two models of cognitive agency. Finally, the article explains how an agent‐based approach rescues the credit theory from an apparent counterexample. The article's defense of the credit theory is qualified, however, for one lesson that emerges is that credit theories are theories of subjective justification, not theories of knowledge.

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Autonomy and Personal Integration

Cited by 82 publications

References 0 publications

Self‐Regulation and the Problem of Human Autonomy: Does Psychology Need Choice, Self‐Determination, and Will?

Self‐Regulation and the Problem of Human Autonomy: Does Psychology Need Choice, Self‐Determination, and Will?

The Heteronomy of Choice Architecture

Knowledge, Credit, and Cognitive Agency

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