We theoretically analyze the light scattering of an optomechanical cavity which strongly interacts with a single two-level system and couples simultaneously to a mechanical oscillator by radiation forces. The analysis is based on the assumptions that the system is driven at low intensity, and that the mechanical interaction is sufficiently weak, permitting a perturbative treatment. We find quantum interference in the scattering paths, which allows to suppress the Stokes-component of the scattered light. This effect can be exploited to reduce the motional energy of the mechanical oscillator.
Sven Bernecker has raised questions about how agent reliabilism should adjudicate clairvoyance cases. 1 Bernecker's charge is that the view cannot accommodate internalist intuitions about such cases while remaining psychologically plausible. His more specific charge is that invoking the notion of cognitive integration does not help. This paper responds to Bernecker's charges. In section 1 we clarify a version of agent reliabilism and Bernecker's objections against it. In section 2 we say more about how the notion of cognitive integration helps to adjudicate clairvoyance cases and other proposed counterexamples to reliabilism. The central idea is that cognitive integration underwrites a kind of belief ownership, which in turn underwrites the sort of responsibility for belief required for subjective justification. In section 3 we say more about what cognitive integration amounts to, drawing on some recent accounts of desire ownership from the literature on autonomy and moral responsibility.
A belief is reflectively lucky if it is a matter of luck that the belief is true, given what a subject is aware of on reflection alone. Various epistemologists have argued that any adequate theory of knowledge should eliminate reflective luck, but doing so has proven difficult. This article distinguishes between two kinds of reflective luck arguments in the literature: local arguments and global arguments. It argues that local arguments are best interpreted as demanding, not that one be reflectively aware of the reliability of the sources of one's beliefs, but that one's beliefs be attributable to one as one's own. The article then argues that global arguments make illegitimate demands, because they require that we be ultimately answerable for our beliefs. In the end, the article argues that epistemologists should shift their focus away from reflective luck and toward the conditions under which beliefs are attributable to cognitive agents. Keywords Reflective luck . Cognitive agency . Epistemic justification . Internalism . ExternalismOn the standard account, a belief is reflectively lucky if it is a matter of luck that the belief is true, given what a subject is aware of on reflection alone. Reflective luck is notoriously difficult to eliminate. Indeed, many epistemologists would say that the task is impossible. Yet, it seems epistemically desirable to eliminate reflective luck, as various thought-experiments purport to show. As a result, it seems that epistemologists should suffer from what Duncan Pritchard calls epistemic angst-'a general fear [or anxiety] about the [fragile] nature of our epistemic position' (Pritchard 2005b: 204).In this article, I argue that we need not feel any anxiety over reflective luck, because the arguments that purport to show that we must eliminate such luck do not obviously motivate that conclusion. To show this, in section 1, I first distinguish Acta Anal (2010) 25:133-154
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