Abstract:Sven Bernecker has raised questions about how agent reliabilism should adjudicate clairvoyance cases. 1 Bernecker's charge is that the view cannot accommodate internalist intuitions about such cases while remaining psychologically plausible. His more specific charge is that invoking the notion of cognitive integration does not help. This paper responds to Bernecker's charges. In section 1 we clarify a version of agent reliabilism and Bernecker's objections against it. In section 2 we say more about how the not… Show more
“…We can clarify my proposal by fleshing out doxastic attributability in terms of what I call belief ownership (see Breyer and Greco, ; and Breyer, ). To start, let's consider Laurence BonJour's notorious case of Norman the clairvoyant:Norman, under certain conditions which usually obtain, is a completely reliable clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter.…”
Section: Doxastic Attributabilitymentioning
confidence: 93%
“…I agree that Sosa and Greco recognize the importance of doxastic attributability. In fact, Greco and I have jointly broached the importance of developing accounts of doxastic attributability and cognitive agency in previous work (Breyer and Greco, 2008). My goal in Section 2 is to highlight the need for such accounts, while my aim in Section 3 is to defend two robust accounts of cognitive agency that can undergird views like those Sosa and Greco defend.…”
Section: Epistemic Credit and Doxastic Attributabilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As Breyer and Greco () note, Fischer and Ravizza vacillate between requiring conscious awareness and implicit awareness in their own account of taking responsibility.…”
According to credit theories of knowledge, S knows that p only if S deserves credit for truly believing that p. This article argues that any adequate credit theory has to explain the conditions under which beliefs are attributable to subjects. It then presents a general account of these conditions and defends two models of cognitive agency. Finally, the article explains how an agent‐based approach rescues the credit theory from an apparent counterexample. The article's defense of the credit theory is qualified, however, for one lesson that emerges is that credit theories are theories of subjective justification, not theories of knowledge.
“…We can clarify my proposal by fleshing out doxastic attributability in terms of what I call belief ownership (see Breyer and Greco, ; and Breyer, ). To start, let's consider Laurence BonJour's notorious case of Norman the clairvoyant:Norman, under certain conditions which usually obtain, is a completely reliable clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter.…”
Section: Doxastic Attributabilitymentioning
confidence: 93%
“…I agree that Sosa and Greco recognize the importance of doxastic attributability. In fact, Greco and I have jointly broached the importance of developing accounts of doxastic attributability and cognitive agency in previous work (Breyer and Greco, 2008). My goal in Section 2 is to highlight the need for such accounts, while my aim in Section 3 is to defend two robust accounts of cognitive agency that can undergird views like those Sosa and Greco defend.…”
Section: Epistemic Credit and Doxastic Attributabilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As Breyer and Greco () note, Fischer and Ravizza vacillate between requiring conscious awareness and implicit awareness in their own account of taking responsibility.…”
According to credit theories of knowledge, S knows that p only if S deserves credit for truly believing that p. This article argues that any adequate credit theory has to explain the conditions under which beliefs are attributable to subjects. It then presents a general account of these conditions and defends two models of cognitive agency. Finally, the article explains how an agent‐based approach rescues the credit theory from an apparent counterexample. The article's defense of the credit theory is qualified, however, for one lesson that emerges is that credit theories are theories of subjective justification, not theories of knowledge.
“…Answering this will require answering why Norman's belief is unjustified. There is significant philosophical literature that attempts to pinpoint exactly which important necessary condition on justification Norman is missing: e.g., a correct etiology (Lyons, , p. 119), proper function (Bergmann, , p. 141; Graham ; Graham ), externalist reliabilist evidence (Comesaña, , p. 582), and integration with the believer's cognitive character (Breyer and Greco, , p. 175). Harmen Ghijsen (, pp.…”
Norman forms the belief that the president is in New York by way of a clairvoyance faculty he doesn’t know he has. Many agree that his belief is unjustified but disagree about why it is unjustified. I argue that the lack of justification cannot be explained by a higher‐level evidence requirement on justification, but it can be explained by a no‐defeater requirement. I then explain how you can use cognitive faculties you don’t know you have. Lastly, I use lessons from the foregoing to compare Norman's belief, formed by clairvoyance, with Sally's theistic belief, formed by a sensus divinitatis.
“…Apesar da clarividência ser confiável (como o gênio maligno do exemplo acima), a intuição é que a crença resultante não é conhecimento (e por isso também não consideraríamos a clarividência uma virtude). Para um debate sobre como interpretar o caso da clarividência, ver Bernecker (2008) e Breyer e Greco (2008). Agradeço ao avaliador por chamar atenção para este ponto.…”
Este artigo visa realizar uma análise desde um ponto de vista da epistemologia social e de uma epistemologia dos vícios para se responder uma pergunta que vem sendo feita em diversas pesquisas de psicologia experimental: O uso da Internet nos torna intelectualmente viciosos? A conclusão a que chego é a de que sim, em determinados contextos, o uso da Internet nos torna intelectualmente viciosos. Para chegar a esta conclusão, analiso um experimento realizado em uma pesquisa de psicologia experimental que afirma que a Internet nos torna intelectualmente arrogantes e uma resposta desde um ponto de vista da epistemologia que defende que este uso pode promover talvez mais virtudes. Em seguida considero a arquitetura da internet dentro de um contexto informacional específico para poder chegar à conclusão de que a internet, em determinados contextos, nos torna sim intelectualmente viciosos.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Epistemologia Social, Epistemologia dos Vícios, Epistemologia das Virtudes, Testemunho, Vícios IntelectuaisABSTRACT: Many call the era in which we currently live as the Information Age. This is because we live in a highly connected world where the flow of information is constant. One of the main sources of information these days is the Internet, whether through Google searches or through the testimony of our friends or companies that we trust on social media. This article aims at an analysis from the point of view of social epistemology and vice epistemology to answer a question that has been asked in several researches of experimental psychology: Does the use of the Internet make us intellectually vicious? My conclusion is that in certain contexts the use of the Internet makes us intellectually vicious. To reach this conclusion, I analyze an experiment conducted in an experimental psychology research that states that the Internet makes us intellectually arrogant and a response from a point of view of epistemology that argues that it may actually promote more virtues. Then I consider the architecture of the Internet within a specific informational context to be able to reach the conclusion that the internet, in certain contexts, makes us rather intellectually vicious.
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