AUCTIONS, <i>EX POST</i> COMPETITION AND PRICES: THE EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS*

Chong, Eshien; Huet, Freddy; Saussier, Stéphane

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8292.2006.00318.x

Cited by 37 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…2 In the UK railway industry, using a panel of the 25 franchisees providing passenger services in 1997-2000, Affuso and Newbery (2000) found that contractors' voluntary investment in rolling stocks increased-presumably leading to better service-towards the end of the contracts. And in the French water industry, Chong, Huet, and Saussier (2006) found that contracts near expiry date had lower prices compared to other contracts, all things being equal. 3 In this paper, we first provide a rationale for such performance patterns; 4 it is based on information decay, due for example to random productivity shocks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration

Iossa

Rey

2014

Journal of the European Economic Association

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Due to technological progress, recent performance is often more informative about future performance prospects than is older performance. We incorporate information decay in a career concern model in which performance depends on type and effort and contract renewal is based on the performance record.In contrast with the career concern literature (e.g. Lewis, 1986; RJE), contractors work harder when the project approaches renewal date and when their reputation is better. Productive investment are crowded out by window-dressing effort in late contract periods, but it is boosted in early periods. More frequent contract renewals strengthen reputational effects and result in improved performance if the relative cost of investment is low, but otherwise long-term contracts induce more effort.Our results are corroborated by some empirical studies showing that performance improves as the contract approaches renewal date.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration

Iossa

Rey

2014

Journal of the European Economic Association

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…On the one hand, Garcia et al (2005) shows that the presence of a small local firm (outsider) in a competitive bidding process does not automatically increase competition leading to a fall in prices. On the other hand, Chong et al (2006b) finds that when operators control the monopoly for the entire duration of the contract, their prices are not mitigated by a direct competition effect. Furthermore, no relationship is found between the prices charged by private operators and ex post competition in water contracting.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, this assumption constitutes a serious limitation because organizational choices might be influenced by numerous characteristics of operating environments, some of which could also affect water prices. Chong et al (2006b) acknowledged this limitation and suggested that future research overcomes it by making organizational choice endogenous. This is the approach we take in our analysis by simultaneously estimating both a price equation and a privatization equation with Heckman sample selection models.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does market concentration affect prices in the urban water industry?

Bel

González‐Gómez

Picazo‐Tadeo

2015

Environ Plann C Gov Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. This paper analyzes the relationship between market concentration in the private segment of the water industry and water prices with a sample of municipalities located in the Southern Spanish region of Andalusia. In doing so, several Heckman sample selection models are estimated with the main finding being that market concentration increases the price of water for residential use charged by private companies. The main policy recommendation is that urban water service privatization must be accompanied by the appropriate regulatory and institutional frameworks to promote competition among businesses and monitor water pricing.

show abstract

“…Renegotiations occur in the event of certain changes or new circumstances that might affect that level of return, or when Government decides to change project features, or is unable to fulfill its obligations, or whether the expected demand/consumption is below a predetermined level, or the market conditions change, and so on (Estache, Guasch, & Trujillo, 2003). The literature has provided some evidence of the consequences, motives, and results of these renegotiations in Latin America (Estache et al, 2003; Estache, Guasch, Iimi, & Trujillo, 2009; Guasch, Laffont, & Straub, 2006, 2007, 2008; Guasch & Straub, 2009), Chile (Engel, Fischer, & Galetovic, 2009), Portugal (Cruz & Marques, 2013a, 2013b; Miranda Sarmento & Renneboog, 2017), France (Athias & Saussier, 2018; Chong, Huet, & Saussier, 2006; Squeren & Moore, 2015), and Germany (Lohmann & Rotzel, 2014).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding the patterns of PPP renegotiations for infrastructure projects in Latin America

Neto

Cruz²,

Sarmento

2017

Competition and Regulation in Network Industries

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The increased use of public–private partnerships (PPPs) around the world to build infrastructures and provide public services has led to several concerns. One of the main pitfalls of PPPs is an abnormal frequency of renegotiations, especially renegotiations occurring during the first years of contract. The Latin American experience has been the most relevant in terms of research on PPP renegotiations. Using the literature on PPP renegotiations in the Latin American context, this article focuses on the analysis and discussion of renegotiations. We use the experience from Brazil, at the State (region) level, of PPPs and renegotiations. From 2006 to 2016, Brazil developed 42 PPP projects in several sectors. From these, 27 were renegotiated at least once. We found a high number of renegotiations within a short period since the start of the contract for the first renegotiation to occur. The motives for renegotiations are mainly perceived from the public sector, particularly failure in planning, concept, and bidding. Electoral periods and the political connections of shareholders also have an impact on renegotiations. Based on the Brazilian experience, we drawn some policy implications.

show abstract

AUCTIONS, EX POST COMPETITION AND PRICES: THE EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS*

Cited by 37 publications

References 21 publications

Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration

Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration

Does market concentration affect prices in the urban water industry?

Understanding the patterns of PPP renegotiations for infrastructure projects in Latin America

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About