Attitudes and non-attitudes: Continuation of a dialogue

Converse, Philip E.

doi:10.1037/e685262012-124

Cited by 230 publications

(308 citation statements)

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“…Building upon a distinction highlighted by Converse (1970), we have referred to this variability as the attitude-nonattitude continuum (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). At the non-attitude end of the continuum is the case of the individual lacking any a priori evaluative association to the object.…”

Section: Attitudes As Object-evaluation Associationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Attitudes as Object–Evaluation Associations of Varying Strength

2007

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Historical developments regarding the attitude concept are reviewed, and set the stage for consideration of a theoretical perspective that views attitude, not as a hypothetical construct, but as evaluative knowledge. A model of attitudes as object-evaluation associations of varying strength is summarized, along with research supporting the model's contention that at least some attitudes are represented in memory and activated automatically upon the individual's encountering the attitude object. The implications of the theoretical perspective for a number of recent discussions related to the attitude concept are elaborated. Among these issues are the notion of attitudes as "constructions," the presumed malleability of automatically-activated attitudes, correspondence between implicit and explicit measures of attitude, and postulated dual or multiple attitudes.For nearly 25 years now, a particular view of attitudes has formed the underpinnings of my research program on the consequences of attitudes for attention, categorization, judgment, and behavior. It was in 1982 that my colleagues and I first proposed that attitudes can be viewed as object-evaluation associations in memory (Fazio, Chen, McDonel, & Sherman, 1982). The perspective has proven much more illuminating (and occupied us for much longer) than we had envisioned at the time. It has fostered examination of a wide variety of questions regarding attitudes, and it continues to provide a valuable perspective for considering new issues. In this article, I summarize the theoretical model and some of the research findings that support it, as well as the perspective the model provides regarding some recent discussions of attitudes as constructions, the presumed malleability of attitudes, correspondence between implicit and explicit measures of attitude, and postulated dual or multiple attitudes.

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Section: Attitudes As Object-evaluation Associationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Attitudes as Object–Evaluation Associations of Varying Strength

2007

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“…Associative representations about the target concept may be just one source of information on which propositions are based. Other sources include autobiographical memory and general knowledge structures about the world and the self (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2004;Koole et al, 2001) or propositions generated on the spot (e.g., Converse, 1970; e.g., Wilson & Hodges, 1992). For example, a person's explicit representation of a Cadillac may be based on more than just the implicit evaluation of the car, incorporating also judgements derived from information about price, fuel consumption, and maintenance expenses, the more the person deliberates about the car.…”

Section: Additional Information Integrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

What moderates implicit—explicit consistency?

Hofmann¹,

Gschwendner²,

Nosek³

2005

European Review of Social Psychology

178

145

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Implicit and explicit indicators of attitudes or personality traits are positively, and variably, related. This review places the question of implicit -explicit consistency into the tradition of attitude/trait -behaviour consistency (e.g., Wicker, 1969). Drawing on dual-process models, such as the recent distinction between associative and propositional representations (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), we identify a working model of implicit -explicit consistency that organises the empirical evidence on implicit -explicit moderation into five factors: translation between implicit and explicit representations (e.g., representational strength, awareness), additional information integration for explicit representations (e.g., need for cognition), properties of explicit assessment (e.g., social desirability concerns), properties of implicit assessment (e.g., situational malleability), and research design factors (e.g., sampling bias, measurement correspondence).A significant proportion of psychological research over the last three decades concerns the automatic nature of information processing (Bargh, 1997;Khilstrom, 1999;Wegner & Bargh, 1998). Theory and empirical data have broadened notions of core psychological concepts like attitudes, stereotypes, self-concept, goals, personality, and self-esteem to include not Correspondence should be addressed to Wilhelm Hofmann, Fachbereich 8 -Psychologie Universita¨t Koblenz-Landau, Fortstraße 7, 76829 Landau, Germany. Email: hofmannw@ uni-landau.de Preparation of this chapter was supported by a grant from the German Science Foundation (DFG) to Manfred Schmitt (Schm 1092/5-1) and by a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health to Brian Nosek (R01 MH-068447). We would like to thank Rainer Banse, Boris Egloff, Malte Friese, Bertram Gawronski, and Jane Thompson for valuable comments on an earlier version of this chapter.EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2005, 16, 335 -390 2005 European Association of Experimental Social Psychology http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/pp/10463283.html DOI: 10.1080/10463280500443228 just the explicit assessments that are products of introspection, but also implicit components of these constructs that may occur outside of conscious awareness or control (Asendorpf, Banse, & Mu¨cke, 2002;Greenwald & Banaji, 1995;Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Whereas implicit constructs are assumed to operate automatically and may be inaccessible to conscious experience, their explicit counterparts are conceptualised as reflective (conscious) and capacity-consuming mental representations that influence action through deliberation (e.g., Bargh, 1994;Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). This distinction plays a role in a variety of dual-process theories that distinguish two modes of information processing such as implicit vs explicit (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995;Wilson et al., 2000), automatic vs controlled (Bargh, 1994), impulsive vs reflective (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), and associative vs rule-based (Sloman, 1996;Smith & DeCoster, 2000). These theories share an assumpti...

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“…These results, obtained across a broad range of topics and respondents, suggest that vested interest is an important moderator of consistency between attitudes and policy endorsement. © 2001 Elsevier Science (USA) Coinciding with the development of dual process models of attitude change in social psychology is the complementary consideration of the effect of personal relevance on the behavioral expression of attitudes and on attitude-criterion consistency (Chaiken, 1987;Converse, 1964Converse, , 1970Crano, 1995Crano, , 1997aJohnson & Eagly, 1989;Miller, 1999;Petty & Cacioppo, 1990;Sears & Funk, 1991). From Hovland's time onward, involvement has played a consequential role in theories of attitude (Crano, 2000;Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953).…”

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The Pervasive Effects of Vested Interest on Attitude–Criterion Consistency in Political Judgment

Lehman

Crano

2002

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

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The vested interest construct suggests that people act in attitudinally consistent ways on important issues of high hedonic relevance. Accordingly, vested individuals should endorse policies consistent with their attitudes. Symbolic politics holds self-interest unrelated to attitude and thus of little use. Three secondary analyses of national election data assessed the predictive utility of vested interest on policy-related issues. Consistent with expectations, Analysis 1 found vested interest to be unrelated to policy endorsement. However, Analysis 2 disclosed that vested interest significantly moderated attitude-endorsement consistency on beliefs regarding busing, health insurance, and government-guaranteed living standards. Analysis 3 investigated vested interest effects across three national election surveys and six policy issues. Without exception, vested interest significantly moderated the relationship between attitudes and policy endorsement. These results, obtained across a broad range of topics and respondents, suggest that vested interest is an important moderator of consistency between attitudes and policy endorsement. © 2001 Elsevier Science (USA) Coinciding with the development of dual process models of attitude change in social psychology is the complementary consideration of the effect of personal relevance on the behavioral expression of attitudes and on attitude-criterion consistency (Chaiken, 1987;Converse, 1964Converse, , 1970Crano, 1995Crano, , 1997aJohnson & Eagly, 1989;Miller, 1999;Petty & Cacioppo, 1990;Sears & Funk, 1991). From Hovland's time onward, involvement has played a consequential role in theories of attitude (Crano, 2000;Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). Today's models emphasize these constructs in developing hypotheses regarding the likelihood that a persuasive message will be elaborated and that resultant attitudes will guide future behaviors and policy endorsements (Petty & Krosnick, 1995). Although the precise function of involvement in the attitude-criterion equation is not yet specified, most social psychologists contend that such constructs play a central role in attitude change and attitude-criterion consistency.Two qualities distinguish vested interest from other concepts related to personal involvement. First, vested interest requires that the attitude object be hedonically relevant (Crano, 1995;Sivacek & Crano, 1982). Second, only objects considered important, or consequential, are deemed of high vested interest. Hedonic relevance is concerned with the perceived consequences of the attitude object for the daily life of the respondent 1 An attitude object may be considered important but not hedonically relevant (e.g., a major earthquake in a far-off country) or hedonically relevant but not particularly important. To the extent that either prerequisite is not present, the predictive power of the construct will be diminished. Support for the concept of self-or vested interest in political research can be traced to the pioneering efforts of Muzafir Sherif in his work on...

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Attitudes and non-attitudes: Continuation of a dialogue

Cited by 230 publications

References 0 publications

Attitudes as Object–Evaluation Associations of Varying Strength

Attitudes as Object–Evaluation Associations of Varying Strength

What moderates implicit—explicit consistency?

The Pervasive Effects of Vested Interest on Attitude–Criterion Consistency in Political Judgment

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