What moderates implicit—explicit consistency?

Hofmann, Wilhelm; Gschwendner, Tobias; Nosek, Brian A.

doi:10.1080/10463280500443228

Cited by 176 publications

(160 citation statements)

References 129 publications

(311 reference statements)

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“…Understanding the relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes will foster theoretical developments concerning the structure and function of each. Nosek (2005) found evidence for four moderators of implicit and explicit attitude relations: selfpresentation, attitude strength, attitude dimensionality, and attitude distinctiveness (see also Hofmann, Gschwendner, Nosek, & Schmitt, 2005, for a review).…”

Section: Other Components Of the Nomological Net For The Implicit Attmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Multitrait-Multimethod Validation of the Implicit Association Test

Nosek

Smyth

2007

Experimental Psychology

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Abstract. Recent theoretical and methodological innovations suggest a distinction between implicit and explicit evaluations. We applied Campbell and Fiske's (1959) classic multitrait-multimethod design precepts to test the construct validity of implicit attitudes as measured by the Implicit Association Test (IAT). Participants (N = 287) were measured on both self-report and IAT for up to seven attitude domains. Through a sequence of latent-variable structural models, systematic method variance was distinguished from attitude variance, and a correlated two-factors-per-attitude model (implicit and explicit factors) was superior to a single-factor-per-attitude specification. That is, despite sometimes strong relations between implicit and explicit attitude factors, collapsing their indicators into a single attitude factor resulted in relatively inferior model fit. We conclude that these implicit and explicit measures assess related but distinct attitude constructs. This provides a basis for, but does not distinguish between, dual-process and dual-representation theories that account for the distinctions between constructs. Keywords: implicit social cognition, attitudes, individual differences, construct validity, structural equation modelingRealizing that the human mind is more than the sum of its conscious processes, a number of theorists have proposed a conceptual distinction between evaluations that are the products of introspection, called explicit attitudes, and those that occur automatically and may exist outside of conscious awareness, called implicit attitudes (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995;Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Greenwald and Banaji (1995, p. 8), for example, defined implicit attitudes as "introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feelings toward an attitude object." This theory has developed in conjunction with the invention of measurement tools that assess automatic evaluative associations without introspection (e.g., Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986;Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998;Nosek & Banaji, 2001;Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997).Some experiences with these new measurement tools have spawned doubts about whether they measure attitudes at all (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001), and whether a conceptual distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes is worthwhile (Fazio & Olson, 2003). Fazio and Olson contend "it is more appropriate to view the measures as implicit or explicit, not the attitude (or whatever other construct)" (2003, p. 303). The purpose of the research we report was to test whether the structure of attitude variance derived from an implicit measure (the Implicit Association Test [IAT]; Greenwald et al., 1998) and from an explicit one (semantic differentials) is best represented by one latent factor or by two correlated latent factors, when stripped of confounding method variance. If our hypothesis that the latter specification will fit the data better is sustained, it will support a view ...

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Section: Other Components Of the Nomological Net For The Implicit Attmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Multitrait-Multimethod Validation of the Implicit Association Test

Nosek

Smyth

2007

Experimental Psychology

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306

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Section: Stability Of Attitude Changesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In contrast to the case for strong attitudes, ambivalent attitudes are likely to produce much more pliable and unstable evaluative judgments (e.g., Armitage & Conner, 2000), in part because they may elicit greater cognitive elaboration (Hänze, 2001). Without any particular bias to constrain the direction of elaboration, ambivalent evaluative judgments not only may be more unstable but may also be less consistently correlated with automatic evaluative reactions (e.g., Nosek, 2005; see also Hofmann, Gschwendner, Nosek, & Schmitt, 2005).The most general claim of the APE model is that the temporal consistency of evaluative judgments should vary as a function of the temporal consistency of associative evaluations when associative evaluations are considered as a valid basis for evaluative judgments. However, the temporal consistency of evaluative judgments can also be independent of the temporal consistency of associative evaluations when associative evaluations are rejected as a valid basis for evaluative judgments.…”

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confidence: 99%

Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: An integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change.

Gawronski

Bodenhausen²

2006

Psychological Bulletin

2,099

167

2,441

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A central theme in recent research on attitudes is the distinction between deliberate, "explicit" attitudes and automatic, "implicit" attitudes. The present article provides an integrative review of the available evidence on implicit and explicit attitude change that is guided by a distinction between associative and propositional processes. Whereas associative processes are characterized by mere activation independent of subjective truth or falsity, propositional reasoning is concerned with the validation of evaluations and beliefs. The proposed associative-propositional evaluation (APE) model makes specific assumptions about the mutual interplay of the 2 processes, implying several mechanisms that lead to symmetric or asymmetric changes in implicit and explicit attitudes. The model integrates a broad range of empirical evidence and implies several new predictions for implicit and explicit attitude change.Keywords: attitude change, cognitive consistency, dual-process models, evaluative conditioning, implicit measures If eras of psychological research can be characterized in terms of general ideas, a major theme of the current era is probably the notion of automaticity. Many aspects of human behavior that have previously been assumed to have their roots in higher order processes of deliberate reasoning are now viewed as resulting from automatic processes that may occur spontaneously and outside of people's awareness or control (Bargh, 1997;Moors & De Houwer, 2006). This perspective is also dominant in contemporary research on attitudes, in which deliberate, "explicit" attitudes are often contrasted with automatic, "implicit" attitudes (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Petty, Fazio, & Briñol, in press;Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, in press). Whereas the former are usually equated with deliberative, self-reported evaluations, the latter are typically inferred from people's performance on response latency measures, such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) or sequential priming tasks (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995;Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997).Even though previous models effectively account for the differential impact of implicit and explicit attitudes on spontaneous and deliberate behavior (e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004;Wilson et al., 2000), theories of attitude change still face a considerable asymmetry in integrating the available evidence. Contemporary models of persuasion have been very successful in explaining the influence of different kinds of message cues on self-reported explicit evaluations (Chen & Chaiken, 1999;Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999;Petty & Wegener, 1999; for a review, see Visser & Cooper, 2003). However, changes in implicit attitudes are still largely unexplained. This shortfall has its roots in at least two conceptual issues. First, several models of attitude change do not distinguish between implicit and explicit attitudes in the first place but treat attitudes as a unitary construct (e.g., Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989...

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“…The propositional account can only explain EC effects in implicit and physiological measures if it is additionally assumed that these indirect measures are not impervious to higher order cognitive processes (see De Houwer, 2006;De Houwer et al, 2005). It is true, however, that the propositional account in its present form is relatively mute with regard to the possible interplay of propositional and associative representations (see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006;Hofmann, Gschwendner, Nosek, & Schmitt, 2005, for models specifying such an interplay) and with regard to the translation of propositional beliefs into specific physiological responses such as eyeblink startle reflexes (Baeyens, Vansteenwegen, & Hermans, 2009; but see Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009a, for a response to this criticism).…”

Section: What Are the Processes Underlying Evaluative Conditioning?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluative conditioning in humans: A meta-analysis.

Hofmann

Houwer

Perugini

et al. 2010

Psychological Bulletin

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804

755

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This article presents a meta-analysis of research on evaluative conditioning (EC), defined as a change in the liking of a stimulus (conditioned stimulus; CS) that results from pairing that stimulus with other positive or negative stimuli (unconditioned stimulus; US). Across a total of 214 studies included in the main sample, the mean EC effect was d ϭ .52, with a 95% confidence interval of .466 -.582. As estimated from a random-effects model, about 70% of the variance in effect sizes were attributable to true systematic variation rather than sampling error. Moderator analyses were conducted to partially explain this variation, both as a function of concrete aspects of the procedural implementation and as a function of the abstract aspects of the relation between CS and US. Among a range of other findings, EC effects were stronger for high than for low contingency awareness, for supraliminal than for subliminal US presentation, for postacquisition than for postextinction effects, and for self-report than for implicit measures. These findings are discussed with regard to the procedural boundary conditions of EC and theoretical accounts about the mental processes underlying EC.Keywords: evaluative conditioning, affective learning, attitude learning, associative learning, propositional learning One of the most influential ideas in psychology is that human behavior is, to a large extent, governed by likes and dislikes (Allport, 1935;Martin & Levey, 1978). For instance, people prefer the company of people they like and try to avoid those they do not like; people buy and consume products they like rather than those they dislike; and they vote for and support politicians and ideas that they find sympathetic rather than repelling. Furthermore, preferences influence attention, memory, and judgments and form the basis of our emotional life (Fox, 2009). Given the pervasive impact of preferences on behavior, it is vital for our discipline to understand how preferences are formed and how they can be influenced. Although some likes and dislikes may be genetically determined (Poulton & Menzies, 2002), the vast majority of our preferences are learned rather than innate (Rozin & Millman, 1987). But precisely how humans acquire their likes and dislikes continues to be the subject of vigorous debate (Rozin, 1982;De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001).The present article provides a meta-analysis of research on one possible manner in which likes and dislikes can be learned: evaluative conditioning (EC), which may be best defined as an effect that is attributed to a particular core procedure. Specifically, EC refers to a change in the valence of a stimulus (the effect) that is due to the pairing of that stimulus with another positive or negative stimulus (the procedure) (De Houwer, 2007a;De Houwer et al., 2001). The first stimulus is often referred to as the conditioned stimulus (CS), and the second stimulus is often referred to as the unconditioned stimulus (US). Typically, a CS becomes more positive when it has been paired with a posit...

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What moderates implicit—explicit consistency?

Cited by 176 publications

References 129 publications

A Multitrait-Multimethod Validation of the Implicit Association Test

A Multitrait-Multimethod Validation of the Implicit Association Test

Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: An integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change.

Evaluative conditioning in humans: A meta-analysis.

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