Attention, Seeing, and Change Blindness

Tye, Michael

doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2010.00180.x

Cited by 28 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 33 publications

(23 reference statements)

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“…For example, Block notes that subjects can have de re thoughts about it (they can ask of it 'what is that?'). This Block takes as further evidence that the middle 'A' was represented in phenomenal consciousness (Block 2013, p. 177; see also Dretske 2007;Siegel 2006;Tye 2009a, p. 59, and2009b). The interpretation just given can accommodate this.…”

Section: An Analysis Of Block's Argumentmentioning

confidence: 70%

Is the grain of vision finer than the grain of attention? Response to Block

Taylor¹

2013

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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In many theories in contemporary philosophy of mind, attention is constitutively linked to phenomenal consciousness (e.g. Prinz 2012). Ned Block (2013) has recently argued that 'identity crowding' provides an example of subjects consciously seeing something to which they are unable to attend. Here I examine the reasons that Block gives for thinking that this is a case of a consciously perceived item that we are unable to attend to, and I offer a different interpretation.

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Section: An Analysis Of Block's Argumentmentioning

confidence: 70%

Is the grain of vision finer than the grain of attention? Response to Block

Taylor¹

2013

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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“…To see something it must be visually differentiated from a background (Dretske ; Siegel ). Michael Tye (, p. 414) considers a version of Figure (Cavanagh, He et al ) noting that one cannot count the bars: “Why not? Surely because it is not the case that each bar on the right is clearly marked out or differentiated in the phenomenology of your experience.…”

Section: The Concept Of Seeing An Objectmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Grain of Vision and the Grain of Attention

Block

2012

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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Often when there is no attention to an object, there is no conscious perception of it either, leading some to conclude that conscious perception is an attentional phenomenon. There is a well‐known perceptual phenomenon—visuo‐spatial crowding, in which objects are too closely packed for attention to single out one of them. This article argues that there is a variant of crowding—what I call “identity‐crowding”—in which one can consciously see a thing despite failure of attention to it. This conclusion, together with new evidence that attention to an object occurs in unconscious perception, suggests there may be a double dissociation between conscious perception of an object and attention to that object, constraining the extent to which consciousness can be constitutively attentional. The argument appeals to a comparison between the minimal resolution (or “grain”) of object‐attention and object‐seeing.

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“…Unattended features of two pictures can differ without the perceivers noticing the difference, despite what seems to be clear perception of both pictures. According to the 'inattentional blindness' interpretation of this phenomenon [11][12][13][14][15], one does not notice the difference because one simply does not consciously see the specific aspect of the scene that constitutes the difference (for instance, the item that is present in one picture, absent in the other). According to the 'inattentional inaccessibility' interpretation [1,[4][5][6][16][17][18][19], one normally consciously sees the item that constitutes the difference but fails to categorize or conceptualize it in a way that allows for comparison.…”

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confidence: 99%