Experiences and feelings are inherently conscious states. There is something it is like to feel pain, to have an itch, to experience bright red. Philosophers call this sort of consciousness "phenomenal consciousness." Even though phenomenal consciousness seems to be a relatively primitive matter, something more widespread in nature than higher-order or reflective consciousness, it is deeply puzzling. In 1995 Michael Tye proposed a theory of phenomenal consciousness now known as representationalism. This book is, in part, devoted to a further development of that theory along with replies to common objections. Tye's focus is broader than representationalism, however. Two prominent challenges for any reductive theory of consciousness are the explanatory gap and the knowledge argument. In part I of this book, Tye suggests that these challenges are intimately related. The best strategy for dealing with the explanatory gap, he claims, is to consider it a kind of cognitive illusion. Part II of the book is devoted to representationalism. Part III connects representationalism with two more general issues. The first is the nature of color. Tye defends a commonsense, objectivist view of color and argues that such a view is compatible with modern color science. In the final chapter, Tye addresses the question of where on the phylogenetic scale phenomenal consciousness ceases, arguing that consciousness extends beyond the realm of vertebrates to such relatively simple creatures as the honeybee. Bradford Books imprint

Can neurophysiology ever reveal to us what it is like to smell a skunk or to experience pain? In what does the feeling of happiness consist? How is it that changes in the white and gray matter composing our brains generate subjective sensations and feelings? These are several of the questions that Michael Tye addresses, while formulating a new and enlightening theory about the phenomenal "what it feels like" aspect of consciousness. The test of any such theory, according to Tye, lies in how well it handles ten critical problems of consciousness. Tye argues that all experiences and all feelings represent things, and that their phenomenal aspects are to be understood in terms of what they represent. He develops this representational approach to consciousness in detail with great ingenuity and originality. In the book's first part Tye lays out the domain, the ten problems and an associated paradox, along with all the theories currently available and the difficulties they face. In part two, he develops his intentionalist approach to consciousness. Special summaries are provided in boxes and the ten problems are illustrated with cartoons. Bradford Books imprint

Background Esophagogastric junction (EGJ) distensibility and distension-mediated peristalsis can be assessed with the functional lumen imaging probe (FLIP) during a sedated upper endoscopy. We aimed to describe esophageal motility assessment using FLIP topography in patients presenting with dysphagia. Methods 145 patients (ages 18 – 85, 54% female) with dysphagia that completed upper endoscopy with a 16-cm FLIP assembly and high-resolution manometry (HRM) were included. HRM was analyzed according to the Chicago Classification of esophageal motility disorders; major esophageal motility disorders were considered ‘abnormal’. FLIP studies were analyzed using a customized program to calculate the EGJ-distensibility index (DI) and generate FLIP topography plots to identify esophageal contractility patterns. FLIP topography was considered ‘abnormal’ if EGJ-DI was < 2.8 mm2/mmHg or contractility pattern demonstrated absent contractility or repetitive, retrograde contractions. Results HRM was abnormal in 111 (77%) patients: 70 achalasia (19 type I, 39 type II, 12 type III), 38 EGJ outflow obstruction, and three jackhammer esophagus. FLIP topography was abnormal in 106 (95%) of these patients, including all 70 achalasia patients. HRM was ‘normal’ in 34 (23%) patients: five ineffective esophageal motility and 29 normal motility. 17 (50%) had abnormal FLIP topography including 13 (37%) with abnormal EGJ-DI. Conclusions FLIP topography provides a well-tolerated method for esophageal motility assessment (especially to identify achalasia) at the time of upper endoscopy. FLIP topography findings that are discordant with HRM may indicate otherwise undetected abnormalities of esophageal function, thus FLIP provides an alternative and complementary method to HRM for evaluation of non-obstructive dysphagia.

No abstract