Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access

Block, Ned

doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.001

Cited by 460 publications

(412 citation statements)

References 77 publications

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“…Thus, the awareness ratings should be more sensitive when the identification task decision is made before awareness rating. In the context of the recent theoretical discussion on the characteristics of conscious processing (Block, 2011;Cohen & Dennett, 2011;Lamme, 2010;Lau & Rosenthal, 2011), our results suggest that perceptual consciousness should not be perceived as a passive, rich and detailed expression of the external stimulation formed at the low levels of the visual cortex, as the information processing involved in the decision making significantly increases the accuracy of consciousness reports.…”

Section: Order Factorsmentioning

confidence: 50%

Different subjective awareness measures demonstrate the influence of visual identification on perceptual awareness ratings

Wierzchoń

Paulewicz²,

Asanowicz

et al. 2014

Consciousness and Cognition

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a b s t r a c tWe compare four subjective awareness measures in the context of a visual identification task and investigate quantitative differences in terms of scale use and correlation with task performance. We also analyse the effect of identification task decisions on subsequent subjective reports. Results show that awareness ratings strongly predict accuracy for all scale types, although the type of awareness measure may influence the reported level of perceptual awareness. Surprisingly, the overall relationship between awareness ratings and performance was weaker when participants rated their awareness before providing identification responses. Furthermore, the Perceptual Awareness Scale was most exhaustive only when used after the identification task, whereas confidence ratings were most exhaustive when used before the identification task. We conclude that the type of subjective measure applied may influence the reports on visual awareness. We also propose that identification task decisions may affect subsequent awareness ratings.

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Section: Order Factorsmentioning

confidence: 50%

Different subjective awareness measures demonstrate the influence of visual identification on perceptual awareness ratings

Wierzchoń

Paulewicz²,

Asanowicz

et al. 2014

Consciousness and Cognition

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“…These exciting new electrophysiological studies demonstrate more compellingly than behavioral studies alone the subjective and egocentric nature of the neural representation of the environment in insects, and their capacity for selective attention supports our assertion that insects have a capacity for subjective experience. We note that the relationship between subjective experience and selective attention in humans remains a topic of considerable debate (105,106). Whether selective attention is a prerequisite for consciousness (105) or whether consciousness is broader than what we attend to (106) is quite contentious.…”

Section: Consciousness In Insectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

What insects can tell us about the origins of consciousness

Barron

Klein

2016

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

258

183

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How, why, and when consciousness evolved remain hotly debated topics. Addressing these issues requires considering the distribution of consciousness across the animal phylogenetic tree. Here we propose that at least one invertebrate clade, the insects, has a capacity for the most basic aspect of consciousness: subjective experience. In vertebrates the capacity for subjective experience is supported by integrated structures in the midbrain that create a neural simulation of the state of the mobile animal in space. This integrated and egocentric representation of the world from the animal's perspective is sufficient for subjective experience. Structures in the insect brain perform analogous functions. Therefore, we argue the insect brain also supports a capacity for subjective experience. In both vertebrates and insects this form of behavioral control system evolved as an efficient solution to basic problems of sensory reafference and true navigation. The brain structures that support subjective experience in vertebrates and insects are very different from each other, but in both cases they are basal to each clade. Hence we propose the origins of subjective experience can be traced to the Cambrian. subjective experience | primary consciousness | vertebrate midbrain | central complex

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“…One difficulty concerns the very suggestion that experience can overflow cognitive access. Although this proposal has been influentially defended (e.g., Block 2007Block , 2011, it remains highly controversial (e.g. Kouider et al 2010;Cohen and Dennett 2011;Phillips 2016;Ward et al 2016).…”

Section: Is the Warrant For Ensemble Judgments Immediate?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Ensemble representation and the contents of visual experience

Bayne

McClelland

2018

Philos Stud

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The on-going debate over the 'admissible contents of perceptual experience' concerns the range of properties that human beings are directly acquainted with in perceptual experience. Regarding vision, it is relatively uncontroversial that the following properties can figure in the contents of visual experience: colour, shape, illumination, spatial relations, motion, and texture. The controversy begins when we ask whether any properties besides these figure in visual experience. We argue that 'ensemble properties' should be added to the list of visually admissible properties. Ensemble properties are features that belong to a set of perceptible objects as a whole as opposed to the individuals that constitute that set. They include such features as the mean size of an array of shapes or the average emotional expression of an array of faces. Recent work in vision science has yielded compelling evidence that the visual system routinely encodes such properties. We argue that epistemological considerations provide strong reasons to think that these properties figure in visual experience. Judgements about ensemble properties are immediately warranted by our perceptual experience, and the only plausible way that a perceptual experience could confer this warrant is if it confers awareness of ensemble properties.Tim Bayne and Tom McClelland have contributed equally to this paper, and the order of authors has been determined alphabetically.

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Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access

Cited by 460 publications

References 77 publications

Different subjective awareness measures demonstrate the influence of visual identification on perceptual awareness ratings

Different subjective awareness measures demonstrate the influence of visual identification on perceptual awareness ratings

What insects can tell us about the origins of consciousness

Ensemble representation and the contents of visual experience

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