Asymmetric Evolutionary Games

McAvoy, Alex; Hauert, Christoph

doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004349

Cited by 67 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 58 publications

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“…al. tells that under asymmetric two-player games the evolutionary processes behave macroscopically like that governed by symmetric games [63]. Here we confirm that irrespective of two-player or multiplayer games, the evolutionary dynamics with diverse interactions can be approximated by that governed by a single game.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 79%

“…This is natural in many cases, like when types of edges indicate the geographic proximity. Nevertheless, when edges' types represent the genetic difference between linked individuals and the population evolve based on individuals' reproduction, edges' types evolve as well [63]. A study into the coevolution of individuals' traits and edge types is expected.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with edge diversity

Zhou

Wang

2019

PLoS Comput Biol

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Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties, and social ties between them only serve as the indicator of the existence of interactions. This assumption neglects important information carried by inter-personal social ties such as genetic similarity, geographic proximity, and social closeness, which may crucially affect the outcome of interactions. To model these situations, we present a framework of evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with edge diversity, where different types of edges describe diverse social ties. Strategic behaviors together with social ties determine the resulting payoffs of interactants. Under weak selection, we provide a general formula to predict the success of one behavior over the other. We apply this formula to various examples which cannot be dealt with using previous models, including the division of labor and relationship- or edge-dependent games. We find that labor division can promote collective cooperation markedly. The evolutionary process based on relationship-dependent games can be approximated by interactions under a transformed and unified game. Our work stresses the importance of social ties and provides effective methods to reduce the calculating complexity in analyzing the evolution of realistic systems.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 79%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with edge diversity

Zhou

Wang

2019

PLoS Comput Biol

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“…This is a dimensionless quantity which compares the endowment of resources of an individual with the population average and as such has been particularly useful in analyses related to wealth inequality [35]. In fact, equation (11) indicates that the variance of the rescaled resources ŷ 2 N dictates the time-averaged growth rate. Under this model, networks with larger resource inequality, i.e.…”

Section: A Time-averaged Growth Ratementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this respect, it relates the analytical predictions described by Eq. (11) with the numerical solutions of Eqs. (7) and (8).…”

Section: B Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation dynamics in networked geometric Brownian motion

et al. 2019

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Recent works suggest that pooling and sharing may constitute a fundamental mechanism for the evolution of cooperation in well-mixed fluctuating environments. The rationale is that, by reducing the amplitude of fluctuations, pooling and sharing increases the steady-state growth rate at which individuals self-reproduce. However, in reality interactions are seldom realized in a well-mixed structure, and the underlying topology is in general described by a complex network. Motivated by this observation, we investigate the role of the network structure on the cooperative dynamics in fluctuating environments, by developing a model for networked pooling and sharing of resources undergoing a geometric Brownian motion. The study reveals that, while in general cooperation increases the individual steady state growth rates (i.e. is evolutionary advantageous), the interplay with the network structure may yield large discrepancies in the observed individual resource endowments. We comment possible biological and social implications and discuss relations to econophysics.

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“…The replicator equation has also been extended to structured populations for both symmetric [27] and asymmetric [28] matrix games.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetric evolutionary games with environmental feedback

Hauert

Saade²,

McAvoy

2019

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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Models in evolutionary game theory traditionally assume symmetric interactions in homogeneous environments. Here, we consider populations evolving in a heterogeneous environment, which consists of patches of different qualities that are occupied by one individual each. The fitness of individuals is not only determined by interactions with others but also by environmental quality. This heterogeneity results in asymmetric interactions where the characteristics of the interaction may depend on an individual's location. Interestingly, in non-varying heterogeneous environments, the long-term dynamics are the same as for symmetric interactions in an average, homogeneous environment. However, introducing environmental feedback between an individual's strategy and the quality of its patch results in rich eco-evolutionary dynamics. Thus, individuals act as ecosystem engineers. The nature of the feedback and the rate of ecological changes can relax or aggravate social dilemmas and promote persistent periodic oscillations of strategy abundance and environmental quality. arXiv:1807.01735v2 [q-bio.PE]

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Asymmetric Evolutionary Games

Cited by 67 publications

References 58 publications

Evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with edge diversity

Evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with edge diversity

Cooperation dynamics in networked geometric Brownian motion

Asymmetric evolutionary games with environmental feedback

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