Asymmetric evolutionary games with environmental feedback

Hauert, Christoph; Saade, C; McAvoy, Alex

doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.11.019

Cited by 77 publications

(46 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…Structured interactions arising from environmental heterogeneity, network structure, and spatial structure will add further complexity. Spatial models of environmental feedbacks indicate that feedbacks can lead to correlations between strategies and their environment, with consequences for the stability of cooperation 42,43 . Spatially structured interactions, and more generally, network structured interactions among individuals can fundamentally alter predictions about the strategies that will be successful in a system, but it is not well known what effects such structured interactions will have on a system where strategies and the environment are coupled.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks

2020

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Strategic interactions arise in all domains of life. This form of competition often plays out in dynamically changing environments. The strategies employed in a population may alter the state of the environment, which may in turn feedback to change the incentive structure of strategic interactions. Feedbacks between strategies and the environment are common in social-ecological systems, evolutionary-ecological systems, and even psychological-economic systems. Here we develop a framework of 'eco-evolutionary game theory' that enables the study of strategic and environmental dynamics with feedbacks. We consider environments governed either by intrinsic growth, decay, or tipping points. We show how the joint dynamics of strategies and the environment depend on the incentives for individuals to lead or follow behavioral changes, and on the relative speed of environmental versus strategic change. Our analysis unites dynamical phenomena that occur in settings as diverse as human decision-making, plant nutrient acquisition, and resource harvesting. We discuss implications in fields ranging from ecology to economics.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks

2020

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“…Recent years have seen a growing interest in exploring evolutionary dynamics in a changing and/or heterogeneous environments (41–50). Our model is somewhat different.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary dynamics with game transitions

McAvoy

Wang

et al. 2019

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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118

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The environment has a strong influence on a population’s evolutionary dynamics. Driven by both intrinsic and external factors, the environment is subject to continual change in nature. To capture an ever-changing environment, we consider a model of evolutionary dynamics with game transitions, where individuals’ behaviors together with the games that they play in one time step influence the games to be played in the next time step. Within this model, we study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations and find a simple rule: Weak selection favors cooperation over defection if the ratio of the benefit provided by an altruistic behavior, b, to the corresponding cost, c, exceedsk−k′, where k is the average number of neighbors of an individual andk′captures the effects of the game transitions. Even if cooperation cannot be favored in each individual game, allowing for a transition to a relatively valuable game after mutual cooperation and to a less valuable game after defection can result in a favorable outcome for cooperation. In particular, small variations in different games being played can promote cooperation markedly. Our results suggest that simple game transitions can serve as a mechanism for supporting prosocial behaviors in highly connected populations.

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“…Structured interactions, arising from environmental heterogeneity, network structure, and spatial structure will add further complexity. Spatial models of environmental feedbacks indicate that feedbacks can lead to correlations between strategies and their environment, with consequences for the stability of cooperation (Pepper and Smuts, 2002;Hauert et al, 2018). Spatially structured interactions, and more generally, network structured interactions among individuals can fundamentally alter predictions about the strategies that will be successful in a system, but it is not well know what effects such structured interactions will have on a system where strategies and the environment are coupled.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks

Tilman

Plotkin

Akçay

2018

Preprint

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Strategic interactions form the basis for evolutionary game theory and often occur in dynamic environments. The various strategies employed in a population may alter the quality or state of the environment, which may in turn feedback to change the incentive structure of strategic interactions. This type of feedback is common in social-ecological systems, evolutionary-ecological systems, and even psychological-economic systemswhere the state of the environment alters the dynamics of competing types, and vice versa. Here we develop a framework of "eco-evolutionary game theory" that permits the study of joint strategic and environmental dynamics, with feedbacks. We consider environments governed either by a renewable resource (e.g. common-pool harvesting) or a decaying resource (e.g. pollution byproducts). We show that the dynamics of strategies and the environment depend, crucially, on the incentives for individuals to lead or follow behavioral changes, and on the relative speed of environmental versus strategic change. Our analysis unites dynamical phenomena that occur in settings as diverse as human decision-making, plant nutrient acquisition, and resource harvesting. We discuss the implication of our results for fields ranging from ecology to economics.In many interactions, an individual's payoff depends on both her own strategy or type, 1 as well as the strategic composition in the entire population. Such interactions arise across 2 a range of disciplines, from micro-economics to animal behavior, and they have been ana-3 lyzed using game theory (Nash, 1950; Maynard Smith, 1982). Game-theoretic analysis of 4 competing types typically assumes that the form of strategic interaction is fixed in time, or 5 that it depends on an independent exogenous environment. Real-world systems, however, 6 often feature bi-directional feedbacks between the environment and the nature of strategic 7 interactions: an individual's payoff depends not only her actions relative to the population, 8 but also on the state of the environment, and the state of the environment is influenced by

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Asymmetric evolutionary games with environmental feedback

Cited by 77 publications

References 47 publications

Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks

Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks

Evolutionary dynamics with game transitions

Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks

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