2020
DOI: 10.1038/s41467-020-14531-6
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks

Abstract: Strategic interactions arise in all domains of life. This form of competition often plays out in dynamically changing environments. The strategies employed in a population may alter the state of the environment, which may in turn feedback to change the incentive structure of strategic interactions. Feedbacks between strategies and the environment are common in social-ecological systems, evolutionary-ecological systems, and even psychological-economic systems. Here we develop a framework of 'eco-evolutionary ga… Show more

Help me understand this report
View preprint versions

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

4
143
3

Year Published

2020
2020
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
6
2

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 170 publications
(157 citation statements)
references
References 53 publications
4
143
3
Order By: Relevance
“…2(C), which means the system can finally evolve to many different stable states depending on the initial conditions. This new phenomenon is totally different from the solely interior fixed points situation discussed in previous models [40,41]. Moreover, the equilibrium curve of unstable manifold situations in our model (see Fig.…”
Section: Iii1 Emergence Of Multiple Segments Of Stable and Unstablecontrasting
confidence: 85%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…2(C), which means the system can finally evolve to many different stable states depending on the initial conditions. This new phenomenon is totally different from the solely interior fixed points situation discussed in previous models [40,41]. Moreover, the equilibrium curve of unstable manifold situations in our model (see Fig.…”
Section: Iii1 Emergence Of Multiple Segments Of Stable and Unstablecontrasting
confidence: 85%
“…In addition, f (x, r c ) is a control function that describes the asymmetrical feedback mechanisms in our model. While f actually characterizes the current impact of population strategies on environment, previous works exclusively focus on linear selection gradient feedback laws, such as f = θx − (1 − x) in [40] and f = e L x + e H (1 − x) in [41]. Here, we stress our effects on generality of nonlinearity in feedback control laws, the general form of which is:…”
Section: Modeling Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The cell population size thus changes at a rate equal to the the average payoff times the resource density. Corresponding to these payoffs, the frequencies of cells with the two motility traits change in time according to a replicator equation for the fraction x of fast cells [ 30 , 31 ]. The time variation of the resource density, total cell population size and fraction of fast cells is thus described by the following set of ordinary differential equations: where r and K are the maximum growth rate and the carrying capacity of the resource, respectively (rescaled so that the probability of encounter between the resource and the cells is 1 in a time interval), and d is the mortality rate of cells (assumed to be identical for every cell type).…”
Section: Models and Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We show that the picture changes when feedbacks between cell behaviour and their environment are also taken into account [ 27 30 ]. In our case, this requires considering possible advantages that motility confers to cells both in isolation and as a consequence of collective displacement.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…the environmental state) will conversely affect individual behaviours. To characterize this feedback relation, we here adopt the difference form of the replicator dynamics with environmental feedbacks [20,23] to describe the evolution of the average time proportion of state s 1 :…”
Section: Non-stationary Environmental State Distributionmentioning
confidence: 99%