Artisanal gold mining at the margins of mineral resource governance: a case from Tanzania

Abstract

This article discusses the character of mineral resource governance at the margins of the state in Tanzania and the way artisanal gold miners are incorporated into mineral sector transformation. The landscape of mineral resource exploitation has changed dramatically over the past 20 years: processes of economic liberalisation have heralded massive foreign investment in large-scale gold mining, while also stimulating artisanal activities. Against this background, the article shows how artisanal gold miners are affected by contradictory processes: some have become integrated with state institutions and legal processes, while others, the large majority, are either further excluded or incorporated in ways that exacerbate insecurity and exploitation, underpinned by socio-economic inequalities. These processes are compounded by the actions of large-scale and medium-scale gold mining companies and by poor local governance. It is open to debate whether this will bring improved integration and welfare for artisanal mining communities or new forms of exclusion, although evidence suggests the latter.

Artisanal Gold Mining: A New Frontier in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone?

“…Moreover, the pockets of well-organised youth motorcycle-taxi gangs now found scattered throughout Freetown and many other urban centres throughout the country (see Peters, 2007) could secure considerable work in the numerous small-scale gold mining communities surrounding Makeni: transporting workers back and forth from sites to their homes, as well as moving mine supplies. There would even be opportunities to work as security guards who, in well-established small-scale gold mining countries such as Tanzania, play an important role in protecting sites and keeping encroachers at bay (Fisher, 2008). As illustrated in the likes of Madhia in Guyana, Niew Koffiekamp in Suriname and more recently, Dunkwa in Ghana, a supported small-scale gold mining sector is an engine of economic growth, fuelling the expansion of a series of downstream and allied service industries (see Figure 2).…”

Capturing Critical Institutionalism: A Synthesis of Key Themes and Debates

“…Thus, both Nelson and Agrawal (2008, p. 578) and Ribot et al (2010, p. 39) concur that decentralisation and CBNRM policies are likely to be most effective when the value of resources are high and local rights are secure. On the other hand, a dilemma exists as highly valuable resources that can be used in the 'national interest' incentivise central actors to retain control -even to the point of abrogating or subverting formal legal instruments (Fisher, 2008;Nelson and Agrawal, 2008;Lange, 2011). Further illustrating the significance of the political context, Poteete (2009, p. 290) notes that CBNRM was introduced in Botswana during a period of increasing political competition and attempts at reversing electoral uncertainty account for partial recentralisation of powers from community-based institutions.…”

Navigating obstacles, opportunities and reforms: women’s lives and livelihoods in artisanal mining communities in eastern DRC

“…Matthysen and Montejano (2013) have pointed out that the opacity of the sector is far from chaotic. In reality, although the image of mining in DRC is strongly related to conflict, my view aligns with Fisher's (2008) argument that issues such as mineral resources exploitation, the claims of the local population, the relationships between different actors and how mining activities embody local knowledge and practices do not depend on the level of conflict or the political situation.…”