Artificial moral and legal personhood

Gordon, John‐Stewart

doi:10.1007/s00146-020-01063-2

Cited by 42 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…One of the most important questions in moral and legal philosophy concerns the issue of who is considered a proper member of our moral and legal community. The idea that all human beings should enjoy the full spectrum of human rights has been questioned by many philosophers, who argue that rights and duties should rather concern persons and not human beings as such [5][6][7]. Some contemporary discussions with respect to the application of human rights even attempt to include animals [8,9] and the environment [10] as bearers of human rights.…”

Section: Preliminary Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Of course, human rights can be withheld from a being despite such entitlement, as was the case, for example, with respect to women and African Americans in the United States for hundreds of years. 5 Their human rights were not recognized by their society and were, therefore, not practically useful, but this does not mean that they were not entitled to them. Likewise, intelligent robots might meet, at some point or another, the relevant criteria for possessing human rights (e.g., having full moral and legal personhood), but they might still be unable to exercise those rights due to the lack of social recognition.…”

Section: The Difference Between "Granting" and "Recognizing" Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Human rights for robots? A literature review

Gordon

Pasvenskienė

2021

AI Ethics

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This literature review of the most prominent academic and non-academic publications in the last 10 years on the question of whether intelligent robots should be entitled to human rights is the first review of its kind in the academic context. We review three challenging academic contributions and six non-academic but important popular texts in blogs, magazines, and newspapers which are also frequently cited in academia. One of the main findings is that several authors base their critical views (i.e. views against recognizing human rights for robots) on misleading ethical and philosophical assumptions and hence offer flawed arguments regarding the moral and legal status of artificial intelligent robots and their possible claims to human rights. Our analysis sheds light on some of the complex and challenging issues related to the crucial question of whether intelligent robots with human-like capabilities are eventually entitled to human rights (or not).

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Section: Preliminary Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Difference Between "Granting" and "Recognizing" Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human rights for robots? A literature review

Gordon

Pasvenskienė

2021

AI Ethics

Self Cite

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“…While a moral agent can act morally and possibly be deemed responsible for its actions, to be a moral patient implies that society has responsibilities towards it (Bryson, 2018). Moral patients have a certain moral status, hence suggesting that they have legitimate interests that other agents should consider, i.e., there are constraints on how one treats a moral patient (Gordon, 2020). Extensive philosophical literature has debated which conditions ground moral status.…”

Section: Moral Status Of Artificial Intelligence and Robotsmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Social-Relational Moral Standing of AI: An Empirical Study Using AI-Generated Art

et al. 2021

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The moral standing of robots and artificial intelligence (AI) systems has become a widely debated topic by normative research. This discussion, however, has primarily focused on those systems developed for social functions, e.g., social robots. Given the increasing interdependence of society with nonsocial machines, examining how existing normative claims could be extended to specific disrupted sectors, such as the art industry, has become imperative. Inspired by the proposals to ground machines’ moral status on social relations advanced by Gunkel and Coeckelbergh, this research presents online experiments (∑N = 448) that test whether and how interacting with AI-generated art affects the perceived moral standing of its creator, i.e., the AI-generative system. Our results indicate that assessing an AI system’s lack of mind could influence how people subsequently evaluate AI-generated art. We also find that the overvaluation of AI-generated images could negatively affect their creator’s perceived agency. Our experiments, however, did not suggest that interacting with AI-generated art has any significant effect on the perceived moral standing of the machine. These findings reveal that social-relational approaches to AI rights could be intertwined with property-based theses of moral standing. We shed light on how empirical studies can contribute to the AI and robot rights debate by revealing the public perception of this issue.

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“…Footnote 26 (continued) 27 This could change if robots become able to create other robots. 28 For a good discussion of the moral and legal status of intelligent robots, see Gordon (2020). 29 As in Sect.…”

Section: It Matters That Humans Could Be In Relationships Characterismentioning

confidence: 99%

Could you hate a robot? And does it matter if you could?

Ryland

2021

AI & Soc

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This article defends two claims. First, humans could be in relationships characterised by hate with some robots. Second, it matters that humans could hate robots, as this hate could wrong the robots (by leaving them at risk of mistreatment, exploitation, etc.). In defending this second claim, I will thus be accepting that morally considerable robots either currently exist, or will exist in the near future, and so it can matter (morally speaking) how we treat these robots. The arguments presented in this article make an important original contribution to the robo-philosophy literature, and particularly the literature on human–robot relationships (which typically only consider positive relationship types, e.g., love, friendship, etc.). Additionally, as explained at the end of the article, my discussions of robot hate could also have notable consequences for the emerging robot rights movement. Specifically, I argue that understanding human–robot relationships characterised by hate could actually help theorists argue for the rights of robots.

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Artificial moral and legal personhood

Cited by 42 publications

References 30 publications

Human rights for robots? A literature review

Human rights for robots? A literature review

On the Social-Relational Moral Standing of AI: An Empirical Study Using AI-Generated Art

Could you hate a robot? And does it matter if you could?

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