Aristotle’s Peculiarly Human Psychology

Abstract

For Aristotle, human cognition has a lot in common both with non-human animal cognition and with divine cognition. With non-human animals, humans share a non-rational part of the soul and non-rational cognitive faculties (DA 427b6-14, NE 1102b29 and EE 1219b24-6). With gods, humans share a rational part of the soul and rational cognitive faculties (NE 1177b17-1178a8). The rational part and the non-rational part of the soul, however, coexist and cooperate only in human souls (NE 1102b26-9, EE 1219b28-31). In this chapter, I show that a study of this cooperation helps to uncover some distinctive aspects of human cognition and desire. Humans have a peculiarly expanded non-rational perceptual and desiderative range. This difference in sophistication is not merely a matter of enhanced discriminatory capacities: humans also have the peculiar ability to exercise deliberative phantasia at will and the peculiar ability to synthesise many phantasmata into one. 1 Human rational cognition, in turn, differs from divine cognition because it can be hindered or supported by non-rational cognition. Human rational cognition also involves peculiar abilities, including the ability to direct non-rational cognition and non-rational affections by means of concentration and the appropriate kinds of pleasures, pains, exhortations and reproofs. Uncovering these peculiarities of human cognition is important in order to solve a puzzle about the links between Aristotle's psychology and his ethics. Aristotle thinks that ethicists and political scientists should have some knowledge of psychology and in particular of the rational part and the non-rational part of the human soul (NE 1102a23-8). He also endorses a "peculiarity criterion" according to which ethicists and political scientists