Ethics for Rational Animals

Abstract

This monograph engages in a comprehensive study of Aristotle’s moral psychology in order to give a new account of his views on practical wisdom, virtue and akrasia. Aristotle’s moral psychology is characterised as a qualified intellectualism. The view is intellectualistic because it describes practical wisdom as the sort of knowledge that can govern desire and action, and akrasia as involving a form of ignorance. However, Aristotle’s intellectualism is qualified because practical wisdom goes beyond grasping the truth about the human good, for it must also be able to convey the truth persuasively to non-rational cognition and desires. Conversely, ethical rational failures are not only failures to grasp the truth, but also failures to be persuaded by it. Practical wisdom does not merely articulate, silence or manipulate non-rational cognitions and desires. Rather, it persuades them with explanations that are comprehensible and compelling. Virtue, in turn, involves perfecting the ability to listen to reason by learning to recognise fine and shameful things perceptually. Akrasia is a form of ignorance because it implies the failure of the agent to produce the persuasive explanations that would remove her vicious desires. Contrary to what is commonly assumed, bad desires are a symptom, not a cause, of the ignorance of the akratic. This ignorance, furthermore, is compatible with the akratic holding the belief that she is doing something wrong while she acts. The conclusions about practical wisdom, virtue and akrasia are drawn on the basis of a study of Aristotle’s views on perception, thought, phantasia, attention and desire.