Are Voters Better Represented?

Griffin, John D.; Newman, Brian

doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00357.x

Cited by 265 publications

(163 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…Without active participation in politics, or a lack of communication between representatives and the represented, it is difficult to implement policies reflecting citizens' preferences. Griffin and Newman (2005) underline this point with their finding that voters are better represented than non-voters. Theoretically, then, we might expect that higher turnout levels lead to less inequality in representation.…”

Section: Understanding Differential Responsivenessmentioning

confidence: 83%

Differential Responsiveness in Europe: The Effects of Preference Difference and Electoral Participation

Peters¹,

Ensink²

2014

West European Politics

113

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Section: Understanding Differential Responsivenessmentioning

confidence: 83%

Differential Responsiveness in Europe: The Effects of Preference Difference and Electoral Participation

Peters¹,

Ensink²

2014

West European Politics

113

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“…An alternative notion of popular control is that policy choices are determined by the opinion of a majority of voters, as opposed to all citizens (Griffin and Newman, 2005). If voters have different preferences than nonvoters, and policy responds to voters rather than nonvoters, estimated congruence will be higher for voters than nonvoters.…”

Section: Summary Of Congruence In the Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Popular Control of Public Policy: A Quantitative Approach

Matsusaka

2010

QJPS

122

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The quality of government is often measured by the degree of congruence between policy choices and public opinion, but there is not an accepted method for calculating congruence. This paper offers a new approach to measuring policy-opinion congruence, and uses it to study 10 high-profile issues across the 50 states. For the issues examined, states chose the policy preferred by a majority of citizens (equivalent to the median voter outcome) 59 percent of the time -only 9 percent more than would have happened with random policymaking. Majoritarian/median outcomes were 18-19 percent more likely when direct democracy was available, and 11-13 percent more likely when judges were required to stand for reelection. The likelihood of a majoritarian/median outcome was not correlated with a variety of election laws, including campaign contribution limits, public funding of campaigns, and commission-based redistricting.In a democracy, citizen preferences are supposed to play an important role in public policy decisions. Indeed, as Erikson et al. (1993, p. 1) note, "we often gauge the quality of government by the responsiveness of public policymaking to the preferences of the mass public," and scholars and activists continue to search for institutions that will enhance responsiveness. The Downsian model (Downs, 1957) shows that competition between * I received helpful comments from Michael Alvarez, Jonathan Barnett, Christina Gathmann, Tim Groseclose, Andy Hanssen, Arthur Lupia, Mathew McCubbins, Jaffer Qamar, anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Stanford University, UC-San Diego, the University of Chicago, and the University of Southern California. candidates can bring policy decisions into alignment with the preferences of the median voter, but the predominant theme of recent research is the many obstacles that stand in the way of citizen control, such as the limited information of voters and representatives (Campbell et al., 1960;Miller and Stokes, 1963;Lupia and McCubbins, 1998;Groseclose and McCarty, 2000), interest groups (Olson, 1965;Stigler, 1971;Peltzman, 1976;Grossman and Helpman, 2001), and legislative structure (Weingast et al., 1981;Cox and McCubbins, 2005). Opinion surveys consistently reveal that most citizens believe government responds more to powerful interests than the general public.Despite its importance for the practice and study of democracy, there is little statistical evidence on the amount of congruence between preferences and policy that actually prevails, and little evidence on how institutions affect the amount of congruence. Numerous studies, such as the well-known contributions of Erikson et al. (1993), Borcherding and Deacon (1972), Bergstrom andGoodman (1973), andStimson et al. (1995) document a correlation between policy and indirect measures of citizen preferences, such as demographic and economic variables or indexes of ideology along a liberal-conservative continuum. 1 While such evidence shows that policies respond at the margin to changes in opinion, several studies ...

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“…There are complex reasons why this might be the case with voting: groups that are known to vote with high probability-e.g. the middle-aged-are more likely to be catered to by policy makers, such that members of largely non-voting groups over time come to the accurate realisation that policy makers pay scant attention to their needs; this further discourages them from engaging with the democratic process and reinforces the vicious cycle of disengagement and under-representation (Birch et al 2013;Griffin and Newman 2005;Hill 2006;Martin 2003).…”

Section: Electoral Participation As a Collective Action Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Democratic Norms, Empirical Realities and Approaches to Improving Voter Turnout

Birch

2017

Res Publica

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Though falling turnout in recent decades has been recognised as a problem for democracy, the solutions that have been proposed have mostly been drawn from the realms of the marketplace and society, rather than that of democracy. The inadequate empirical theory that subtends many policy initiatives designed to improve turnout accounts for why these initiatives have largely failed to achieve their stated aims. I argue that electoral participation should be seen through the conceptual lens of collective action, and that this approach suggests mandatory electoral participation as an equitable and effective coordination device. I further argue that compulsory turnout offers a good fit with democratic norms of equality, rights and political obligation.

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Are Voters Better Represented?

Cited by 265 publications

References 38 publications

Differential Responsiveness in Europe: The Effects of Preference Difference and Electoral Participation

Differential Responsiveness in Europe: The Effects of Preference Difference and Electoral Participation

Popular Control of Public Policy: A Quantitative Approach

Democratic Norms, Empirical Realities and Approaches to Improving Voter Turnout

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