Are some cultures more mind-minded in their moral judgements than others?

Abstract

Cross-cultural research on moral reasoning has brought to the fore the question of whether moral judgements always turn on inferences about the mental states of others. Formal legal systems for assigning blame and punishment typically make fine-grained distinctions about mental states, as illustrated by the concept of mens rea , and experimental studies in the USA and elsewhere suggest everyday moral judgements also make use of such distinctions. On the other hand, anthropologists have suggested that some societies have a morality that is disregarding of mental states, and have marshalled ethnographic and experimental evidence in support of this claim. Here, we argue against the claim that some societies are simply less ‘mind-minded’ than others about morality. In place of this cultural main effects hypothesis about the role of mindreading in morality, we propose a contextual variability view in which the role of mental states in moral judgement depends on the context and the reasons for judgement. On this view, which mental states are or are not relevant for a judgement is context-specific, and what appear to be cultural main effects are better explained by culture-by-context interactions. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

Reputation and punishment sustain cooperation in the optional public goods game

“…Besides punishment, the other key mechanism in sustaining cooperation towards collective action is reputation [31][32][33][34]. Adopting a loose definition, reputation emerges when an individual's actions can be directly or indirectly observed by his peers and used to condition their own behaviours when playing with him.…”

The complexity of human cooperation under indirect reciprocity

“…On top of disagreements, private reputations can also underlie the emergence of antagonist groups [93]. Such disagreements in moral judgements can result from differences in cultures and contexts, as discussed in the present theme issue [94]. The challenges associated with private reputations were also recently studied by Hilbe et al, in a work revealing that most leadingeight social norms lose stability in the context of private reputations systems [44].…”

Preschoolers use the means principle in their moral judgments.

“…For example, the relevant input data are unlikely to be explicit encouragement to attend to the mental states of others and how those mental states are related to moral permissibility of acting. Some cultures refrain from speaking about the mental states of others and actively discourage individuals from doing so (see Barrett & Saxe, 2021). If explicit instruction to attend to the relationship of mental states and morality is in fact relevant, then the amount of input required would be constrained to the amount of input available in the culture with the fewest mentions.…”

“…For example, the relevant input data are unlikely to be explicit encouragement to attend to the mental states of others and how those mental states are related to moral permissibility of acting. Some cultures refrain from 7 Barrett and Saxe (2021) suggest the following possible explanation for the disregard of the accidental/intentional distinction in Yasawa Islanders (and other societies): "Apparent cultural differences in intent sensitivity may arise from differing appraisals of what counts as reasonable prudence and care in particular situations, and for particular actors. People who rely on scarce water, for example, may feel that putting any substance in a communal water supply is inherently dangerous so that even 'accidental' well poisoning is judged harshly, independent of the character's intentions.…”