The complexity of human cooperation under indirect reciprocity

Humans care about having a positive reputation, which may prompt them to help in scenarios where the return benefits are not obvious. Various game-theoretical models support the hypothesis that concern for reputation may stabilize cooperation beyond kin, pairs or small groups. However, such models are not explicit about the underlying psychological mechanisms that support reputation-based cooperation. These models therefore cannot account for the apparent rarity of reputation-based cooperation in other species. Here, we identify the cognitive mechanisms that may support reputation-based cooperation in the absence of language. We argue that a large working memory enhances the ability to delay gratification, to understand others' mental states (which allows for perspective-taking and attribution of intentions) and to create and follow norms, which are key building blocks for increasingly complex reputation-based cooperation. We review the existing evidence for the appearance of these processes during human ontogeny as well as their presence in non-human apes and other vertebrates. Based on this review, we predict that most non-human species are cognitively constrained to show only simple forms of reputation-based cooperation. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The psychological foundations of reputation-based cooperation

Manrique

Zeidler

Roberts

et al. 2021

“…In both well-mixed [35,36] and structured populations [37,38], simple reputational systems promote and stabilize cooperation. Reputational systems at different levels of complexity have been studied, ranging from the first-order image scoring norm [39], to the second-order standing criterion [40,41] and to the more complex third-order leading eight social norms [42,43] or higherorder norms [44]. While simpler reputational systems have been observed in animals [45], more elaborate systems are more likely to be the domain of human interactions, owing to the complex relationship between actions, reputations and social structures.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reputation and punishment sustain cooperation in the optional public goods game

Podder

Righi

Pancotto

2021

Cooperative behaviour has been extensively studied as a choice between cooperation and defection. However, the possibility to not participate is also frequently available. This type of problem can be studied through the optional public goods game. The introduction of the ‘Loner’ strategy' allows players to withdraw from the game, which leads to a cooperator–defector–loner cycle. While pro-social punishment can help increase cooperation, anti-social punishment—where defectors punish cooperators—causes its downfall in both experimental and theoretical studies. In this paper, we introduce social norms that allow agents to condition their behaviour to the reputation of their peers. We benchmark this with respect both to the standard optional public goods game and to the variant where all types of punishment are allowed. We find that a social norm imposing a more moderate reputational penalty for opting out than for defecting increases cooperation. When, besides reputation, punishment is also possible, the two mechanisms work synergically under all social norms that do not assign to loners a strictly worse reputation than to defectors. Under this latter set-up, the high levels of cooperation are sustained by conditional strategies, which largely reduce the use of pro-social punishment and almost completely eliminate anti-social punishment. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

“…While the idea is very simple, details of IR models can be very complex [33]. Santos et al [34] quantify cognitive complexity in IR and evaluate recent advances and potential extensions of IR models. They identify three determinants of cooperation under IR that can affect both the level of cooperation and the level of complexity and information requirements for IR to promote cooperation.…”

Section: This Issue's Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling

Számadó¹,

Balliet

Giardini

et al. 2021

Large-scale non-kin cooperation is a unique ingredient of human success. This type of cooperation is challenging to explain in a world of self-interested individuals. There is overwhelming empirical evidence from different disciplines that reputation and gossip promote cooperation in humans in different contexts. Despite decades of research, important details of reputation systems are still unclear. Our goal with this theme issue is to promote an interdisciplinary approach that allows us to explore and understand the evolution and maintenance of reputation systems with a special emphasis on gossip and honest signalling. The theme issue is organized around four main questions: What are the necessary conditions for reputation-based systems? What is the content and context of reputation systems? How can reputations promote cooperation? And, what is the role of gossip in maintaining reputation systems and thus cooperation? This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.