Preschoolers use the means principle in their moral judgments.

Abstract

We ask whether moral judgment in preschool children observes a "means principle." It is well established that young children consider both the consequences and the goals of actions when making moral judgments; much less studied is the question of whether the means used to attain a given goal also matter. By obtaining preschoolers' judgments regarding when, if ever, it is permissible for 1 person to harm another as a means, we show, across 2 experiments, that children (N = 200 across 2 studies; M age = 5.1 yrs.) use the means principle in their moral judgments. Subjects recognized not only when a harm was being used as a means but also situated that means appropriately with respect to the correct superordinate goal. In this respect, the preschoolers in this sample are like adults across a wide range of cultures. These findings have important implications for the understanding of moral development: young children can use an agent's means, and not just her goal, to make a moral judgment. We discuss the broader issue of whether, in light of emerging evidence for the means principle, there really are any moral universals.