Arab Behaviour Towards Israel: Strategic Avoidance or Exploiting Opportunities?

Abstract

Scholars often observe that the foreign policies of states are not made in a vacuum but rather are determined or moulded to a significant degree by the external and internal actions of rivals. Domestic unrest is often considered a potential impetus for changing strategic behaviour. Leaders may be tempted to employ force externally to divert attention away from domestic unrest. The intended result is a 'rally round the flag' effect that culminates in higher approval/support for the executive as citizens forget about domestic problems and pay attention to a common adversary. One implication of this sort of 'diversion' is that potential scapegoats might employ strategic behaviour to avoid becoming a diversionary target. In other words, when they witness domestic unrest in a rival state, they worry that the rival may lash out at them and thus engage in 'strategic avoidance'. 1 Conversely, strategic behaviour may lead to a greater chance that the potential 'diverter' will itself be targeted for hostile behaviour. Erstwhile scapegoats may view periods of social unrest such as elections, domestic political protests or unstable cabinet structures in the other country as convenient and favourable times to escalate hostility. Such situations are viewed as opportunities that are ripe for exploitation.Alastair Smith's work has been extended to both the US case and a comparative cross-national study. 2 Our purpose here is to extend this line of inquiry by looking at a region of the world locked in a long-term hostile relationship; namely, the Middle East. Our approach builds upon previous research that addresses the strategic interaction of enduring rivals. 3 Specifically, we explore strategic avoidance and opportunity exploitation explanations of conflict in the three main Middle Eastern enduring rivalries: Israel-Egypt, Our goal is to determine which theoretical viewpoint best captures hostility dynamics in the Middle East conflict milieu. While we treat all three dyads as rivals, not all three dyads are coded as enduring rivalries during our time frame. We consider the three dyads as a rival milieu and use a cross-national design to capture the general nature of the strategic interaction argument. Regarding this, see Leeds and Davis, 'Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes'.

Scapegoating Strategically: Reselection, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Theory of War

“…Leeds and Davis (1997) find some support for the hypothesis in a cross-national study, and Clark (2003) and Fordham (2005) find support for the case of the United States. DeRouen and Sprecher (2006), however, find no evidence of strategic conflict avoidance in the relations between Israel and Arab states. The model below shows that strategic conflict avoidance is one possible situation that can be observed in equilibrium.…”

“…For reviews of empirical studies on diversionary theory see Levy (1989) and Stohl (1980). Empirical studies of diversionary theory include Bennett and Nordstrom (2000), Chiozza and Goemans (2004), Clark (2003), Dassel and Reinhardt (1999), Davies (2002), DeRouen (1995), DeRouen and Sprecher (2006), Enterline and Gleditsch (2000), Fordham (1998Fordham ( , 2005, Gelpi (1997), Heldt (1999), Leeds and Davis (1997), Miller (1995), Mitchell and Prins (2004), and Pickering and Kisangani (2005).…”

When Is Domestic Political Unrest Related to International Conflict? Diversionary Theory and Japanese Foreign Policy, 1890-19411

“…Political leaders do not need to assure continued support from all groups, but can attain and retain power by bringing together a coalition of groups that are strong enough to defeat other challenges to the government. 11 See Sprecher and DeRouen (2002) and DeRouen and Sprecher (2006) for related work in the diversionary theory literature that utilizes a dyadic-based analysis. 12 We draw upon the classic argument in social psychology that conflict behavior with out-groups can serve to foster social cohesion among in-groups (for example, Simmel 1955;Coser 1956).…”

“…11 11 See Sprecher and DeRouen (2002) and DeRouen and Sprecher (2006) for related work in the diversionary theory literature that utilizes a dyadic‐based analysis. …”

Explaining Extremity in the Foreign Policies of Parliamentary Democracies

“…Many studies, particularly those looking at conflict behavior and dispute escalation, have demonstrated the importance of interaction and reciprocity in dyads. Although some studies using WEIS have examined dyads and reciprocity, these studies are limited to very few states (cf Derouen and Sprecher 2006)…”