Antitakeover provisions and CEO monetary benefits: Revisiting the E-index

Abstract

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Poison pills e governança corporativa: um estudo no mercado acionário brasileiro

“…In this sense, the negative relationship indicates that companies with smaller boards may have a greater propensity to adopt this anti-takeover device, in line with the perspective that smaller boards may be more participative in the managerial process, which leads to more effective decisions (Dah et al, 2017).…”

“…However, some evidence has also been found in consonance with the managerial entrenchment perspective, bearing in mind the positive influence of the duality of a CEO (Dah et al, 2017) and ownership concentration (Harris & Madura, 2010;Bhojraj et al, 2017) in the adoption of this anti-takeover device.…”

“…Binary variable, with 1 being for companies that have poison pills in their company statute, and 0 if they do not. Davis (1991); Mallette e Fowler (1992); Loh (1994); Heron and Lie (2006); Harris and Madura (2010); Arikawa and Mitsusada (2011); Heron and Lie (2015); Bhojraj et al (2017); Dah et al (2017).…”

“…Regarding the firm size, the results indicate that larger firms have a smaller probability of adopting poison pills. In this way, the complexity and high operational costs which are involved in modifying the majority control of companies may make them less susceptible to hostile takeovers, thus reducing the need for the adoption of this anti-takeover device (Dah et al, 2017).…”

“…Based on these two views, various empirical studies have been made to identify the factors associated with the adoption of poison pills by publicly-traded companies (Davis, 1991;Mallette & Fowler, 1992;Loh, 1994;Heron & Lie, 2006;Harris & Madura, 2010;Arikawa & Mitsusada, 2011;Heron & Lie, 2015;Bhojraj, Sengupta, & Suning, 2017;Dah, Michael, & Dixon, 2017). However, the evidence reported in previous studies does not converge in terms of corporate governance aspects as well as economic-financial aspects which are associated with the adoption of poison pills in publicly-traded companies.…”