Antipartisanship and political tolerance in Brazil

Abstract

Introduction: This article propose to connect two research agendas on political behavior: studies on political tolerance and research on partisanship. Search, by connecting these two agendas, to assess the extent to which parties have become targets of political intolerance and thereby to assess the intensity of negative attitudes towards this central institution of democracy. Studies on partisanship conflicts in Brazil have focused on the antagonism opposing petismo and antipetismo. However, the 2018 elections have shown that Brazilians also adopt other forms of antipartisanship. Changes in patterns of political and electoral behavior in recent years can only be properly understood if we consider variation over time in the intensity and scope of antipartisan sentiment. We propose a typology where antipartisanship may be moderate or radical and may have a narrower or broader target. This theme is significant not only for interpreting Brazil’s current political context, but also for deepening understanding of theoretical and analytical questions. Our understanding is that these different types of antipartisanship are distinct phenomena with different effects. Materials and Methods: The data we use to construct the proposed typology and analyze the range and intensity of antipartisanship are derived from an unprecedented Latin America Public Opinion Project initiative to measure political tolerance in Brazil, in its 2017 edition. Our methodology combine variables of disaffection and political intolerance to construct different voter profiles, based on respondent’s attitudes towards unpopular groups, including political parties. After constructing the typology, we propose regression models to estimate the effects of each type on several attitudes, like support to democracy and institutional trust. Results: Our findings show a relationship between the most extreme types of antipartisanship and attitudes towards democracy. Compared with non-antipartisan voters, intolerant antipartisan are less supportive of democracy and democratic institutions and less favorable to freedom of expression and the granting of political rights to minorities. The intensity of antipartisanship matters more than its scope, since the models show that, there is little difference in the degree of commitment to democracy and democratic principles between the two types of intolerant antipartisans, regardless of the scope of the target of their disapproval. This means that attitudes toward democracy, democratic institutions, and democratic principles depend less on the scope antipartisanship, than on political intolerance towards these groups. Discussion: The data and results presented here indicate that antipartisanship is not a one-dimensional phenomenon. The individual is not merely antipartisan or non-antipartisan. We show that antipartisanship contains at least two dimensions: its scope and intensity. Previous studies have already shown the existence of different expressions of antipartisanship, but this diversity has not yet been systematically explored using a well-defined typology. Our work points to this research agenda.

Brazil’s Digital Politics and the Crisis of Democracy (2013-2018)

“…As far as the support for democracy is concerned, in the same period Brazilians' support for democracy decreased in relation to previous years. the media to depict the opposition to Bolsonaro as anti-system [15], and the radicalright wing activism initially perceived as a triumph of democracy ( [16], p. 467).…”

“…As part of this news-sharing behavior, digital media normalized Bolsonaro's populist discourse [15] and disseminated antisystem news that finds its support in the growing antipartisanship of Brazilians [16]. Digital media contributed to the context of political polarization, as the media exercise a gatekeeping role in filtering information to the public [17].…”

“…Electorally, the most affected political parties in this environment were the Workers Party and the PSDB, which monopolized the presidential elections campaign since 1994 and elected all Brazilian presidents from 1994 to 2016. Although antipartisanship equally affected both parties [16], mobilization of right-wing movements, which started to emerge in 2013, became more articulated and influential over time [20]. In this volatile political scenario, the support for military intervention and the mistrust in key political institutions (e.g., judiciary, political parties, congress) was very high in 2018 [21].…”

“…In the political context under which these companies have grown in Brazil, they have functioned as a "filter bubble" and worked in favor of polarization. Indeed, digital communication technologies have created a type of "pernicious polarization" which has been characterized by delegitimization of ideologically opposing groups and by discrediting these groups [16]. The perception among voters of being exposed to disinformation is high in Brazil, but this perception is higher among right-wing voters, who report more the existence of disinformation, than among left and centrist voters [37].…”

“…The electoral support for Rousseff 's party, the Workers Party, substantially decreased in most Brazilian states and municipalities. 16 Rousseff 's reelection was marked by negative campaigns among candidates, fake news, and use of fake accounts on social networks [48]. During the campaign, some candidates resorted to fake news against other candidates.…”