Analytical framework for a comparative study of change in political regimes

Abstract

This chapter reflects on the existence or not of a new wave of democratisation in the wake of the Arab Spring. It is true that simultaneity, contagion, diffusion and emulation do feature in the political dynamics of change following the Arab Spring. However, rather than a democratic tsunami, there were ebbs and flows of a ‘wave of political change’ that has involved differing transformative processes in each country. Secondly, the author offers a typology of political regimes as well as a classification of MENA regimes prior to the Arab Spring, in order to identify the starting point of political change. Thirdly, different types of political change processes are defined and categorised: two general processes of political change (democratisation and autocratisation); and, five specific processes of political change affecting democracies (democratic regression, democratic deepening and consolidation of democracy) or authoritarianisms (political liberalisation and authoritarian progression). And finally, the author presents the methodological framework used in this book to study political change in the MENA countries. This change is analysed with reference to three dimensions: pluralism and political competition (party/representation systems and electoral integrity); government (constitutional reforms, government and state powers, and good governance; and public rights and liberties (political rights, civil rights, rule of law, and civil society).

Democratic disillusionment? Desire for democracy after the Arab uprisings

“…Raised expectations : First, for raising expectations, initial political liberalization is necessary. Of course, people knew change would not come easily, given the historical context of protest and tokenistic and managed reform (see Szmolka, 2017). However, the unique precedent of democratization in Tunisia created an environment in which increments of democracy might be taken more seriously.…”

“…As Brownlee et al (2013: 35) stress, major protest involves large demonstrations with national resonance and persistence: ‘the eruption of nonviolent mass protest over multiple days [and] the spread of that protest across multiple geographical locations ’[emphasis added]. This captures whether the mass protests differ from the (limited) protests and strikes that were taking place across the region before (Moghadam, 2013; Posusney, 2004; Szmolka, 2017; Weyland, 2012) and could thus raise expectations.…”

“…Gurr, 2015; Szmolka, 2017). Morocco is also classified as a protest case here: 10 protests took place across the country, with up to a million people taking to the streets in early 2011 (Gurr, 2015; Moghadam, 2013, Szmolka, 2017).…”

“…The latter question is simple: only Tunisia can be considered democratic a few years after the uprisings. For the former question, I fall back on the conceptualization offered by Szmolka (2017), focusing on (initial) political change: regime transformations that affect the political rules, procedures and institutions and therewith the power relations and processes (Szmolka, 2017: 24; see also Strzelecka and Angustias Parejo, 2017: 115). Changes to the system need to be made in order to be considered substantial.…”

“…The current lack of attention is surprising, because a citizenry’s desire for democracy is generally seen as fundamental to stable, lasting democracies (Geddes, 2011; Hinnebusch, 2006; Welzel and Inglehart, 2009). Moreover, the literature on Arab exceptionalism and MENA authoritarian consolidation draws attention to the popular demands (see Anderson, 2006; Bellin, 2012; Hinnebusch, 2006; Posusney, 2004; Szmolka, 2017; Teti et al, 2019), but only as a cause of elite responses, overlooking that societal-level desire for democracy might also be influenced by societal-level events and their aftermath. Finally, the post-uprising MENA literature on democratic attitudes still lacks a systematic assessment of the uprisings’ impact on the desire for democracy (e.g.…”