Analysis of Strategic Behaviors within Supply Chains: Complementarity between Modeling and Experimentation Methodologies

Boucher, Xavier; Burlat, Patrick; Garapin, Alexis; Llerena, Daniel; Taratynava, Natallia

doi:10.1002/9781118558065.ch6

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

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“…According to these parameter values used in the experiment, we can determine the optimal levels of capacity production (Taratynava et al ., ; Boucher et al . ). When the receiver believes the message

m_{L} false(m_{H} false)

the optimal levels of capacity

K_{L} false(K_{H} false)

are given by

K_{L} \equiv \arg_{K} normalmax E [Π_{R} / L] = 100

K_{H} \equiv \arg_{K} normalmax E [Π_{R} / H] = 150 .

…”

Section: Cheap Talk Game Of the Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…The parameter values considered in the experiment are summarized in Table 1. 14 According to these parameter values used in the experiment, we can determine the optimal levels of capacity production (Taratynava et al 2009;Boucher et al 2010). When the receiver believes the message m L (m H ) the optimal levels of capacity K L (K H ) are given by…”

Section: Cheap Talk Game Of the Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Changing partners in a cheap talk game: Experimental evidence

Bonroy

Garapin

Llerena

2017

Int J of Economic Theory

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This paper considers the effects that the opportunity to change partners has on communication. Our experiment concerns a standard cheap talk game in which a player observes a private forecast before disclosing it (truthfully or untruthfully) in a message that he sends to his partner. Two treatments are applied: in one, each team remains unchanged until the experiment ends; and in the other, players can change their partner. We find that the opportunity to change partners positively affects communication in the relationship. Interestingly, this effect is explained by higher levels of trust in the messages and not by more truthful disclosure of private information

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