Are labels good or bad for consumers and firms? The answer may seem straightforward since labels improve information, yet economic theory reveals situations where their introduction reduces the welfare of at least some market participants. This essay reviews the theoretical literature on labels in order to identify and explain the main reasons that may cause labeling to produce undesirable side-effects. In contrast to earlier reviews that either concentrate on narrow topics or treat the subject in a more or less informal way, we bring together the main results from all the currently important topics by presenting and discussing the assumptions and modelbuilding underpinning them. The advantage of this approach is that it identifies the origin of the differences between results, thus allowing the synthesis of results that sometimes appear even to be contradictory. We focus on "quality labels" and examine: i) the impact of labeling on market structure; ii) the side-effects of costly certification; iii) issues related to the label's
"Supply management in Canada is facing broad trade liberalization pressures. This paper uses a spatial equilibrium trade model to simulate the impacts of various trade liberalization scenarios in the Canadian dairy industry. The results critically hinge on the relationship between increased market access and the market sharing quota (MSQ) at the farm level. Two different MSQ decision rules are simulated: (i) global output at the farm level remains unchanged following liberalization; and (ii) the MSQ is reduced to support the unit production quota rent at its preliberalization level. The results show that if the MSQ is held constant following a potential compromise in the Doha Round, retail prices of fluid milk and cheese would decrease by about 5%. These price movements can be negated by a 1.4% cut in the global MSQ at the farm level. Net welfare gains in the Canadian dairy sector following market access reforms range between $48.2 and $64.2 million when evaluated at the 2003-04 world prices." Copyright (c) 2008 Canadian Agricultural Economics Society.
This paper analyses the economic consequences of labeling in a setting with two vertically related markets. Labeling on the downstream market affects upstream price competition through two effects: a differentiation effect and a ranking effect. The magnitude of these two effects determines who in the supply chain will receive the benefits and who will bear the burden of labeling. For instance, whenever the ranking effect dominates the differentiation effect, the low-quality upstream firm loses from labeling while all downstream actors are individually better off. By decreasing the low-quality input price, the label acts as a subsidy and leads to an increase of the downstream market welfare. This analysis furthers our understanding of the economic consequences of labeling in cases like those of GMOs or restaurants
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