Proceedings of the 18th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing 2017
DOI: 10.1145/3084041.3084044
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

An Online Pricing Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing Data Markets

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1

Citation Types

0
13
0

Year Published

2019
2019
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
6
1
1
1

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 51 publications
(13 citation statements)
references
References 21 publications
0
13
0
Order By: Relevance
“…In [26], a 'double or nothing' incentivecompatible mechanism is proposed to ensure workers behave honesty based on their self-confidence; this protocol is provable to avoid spammers from the crowd, under the assumption that every worker wants to maximize their expected payment. In [40,39,41,42,44,43], Zheng et al, the authors leverage the tools of game theory and mechanism design to analyze the interaction of rational and selfish mobile users, then design efficient incentive mechanisms for four classical and representative applications in mobile Internet: dynamic spectrum redistribution, mobile crowdsensing, data marketplace, and cloud bandwidth management, to stimulate selfish mobile users to cooperate, achieving a win-win situation.…”
Section: Mechanism Design In Crowdsourcingmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In [26], a 'double or nothing' incentivecompatible mechanism is proposed to ensure workers behave honesty based on their self-confidence; this protocol is provable to avoid spammers from the crowd, under the assumption that every worker wants to maximize their expected payment. In [40,39,41,42,44,43], Zheng et al, the authors leverage the tools of game theory and mechanism design to analyze the interaction of rational and selfish mobile users, then design efficient incentive mechanisms for four classical and representative applications in mobile Internet: dynamic spectrum redistribution, mobile crowdsensing, data marketplace, and cloud bandwidth management, to stimulate selfish mobile users to cooperate, achieving a win-win situation.…”
Section: Mechanism Design In Crowdsourcingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Liu et al [16] proposed a context-aware data quality estimation in an online manner. Zheng et al [43] presented the first architecture of the mobile crowd-sensed data market, and conduct an in-depth study of the design problem of online data pricing. A novel online query-based crowd-sensed data pricing mechanism was proposed to determine the trading price of crowd-sensed data.…”
Section: Mechanism Design In Crowdsourcingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The valuations are obtained using different generative random processes, so as to observe the algorithmic behavior under different scenarios. These generative models are motivated by studies modeling valuations for digital goods in online platforms and their pricing [43,18,34,45,47,13,48].…”
Section: Experimental Evaluationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…With improvements in catalogs and portal sites available in the data markets, opportunities for users to obtain data from data holders and providers have increased. Therefore, a data market has been developed in which various stakeholders exchange data and information about the data across different fields [1,2]. In particular, the developments of the Internet of things and cloud computing, and the privilege of mobile, digital markets for data have emerged [3,4].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%