An offer you can refuse: The effect of transparency with endogenous conflict of  interest

Kartal, Melis; Tremewan, James

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.04.003

Cited by 10 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…As another example, a third party (e.g., a special interest, lobby, or industry) that strictly prefers one of the two policies regardless of the state of the world may try to in ‡uence public opinion and policy makers using scientists, experts, NGOs, and news media in order to facilitate the implementation of their preferred policy. Indeed, the tobacco industry, oil and energy lobby, and the military industrial complex have extensively used these channels to disseminate "self-serving news"(see Kartal and Tremewan (2018) and the references therein for detailed examples). Since such news are innocuous in one state of the world and false in the other, the end result is increased obfuscation and reduced media veracity in one state of the world (but not in the other).…”

Section: Large Elections and Extensionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice

Kartal

Tyran

2022

American Economic Review

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This paper studies, theoretically and experimentally, the effects of overconfidence and fake news on information aggregation and the quality of democratic choice in a common-interest setting. We theoretically show that overconfidence exacerbates the adverse effects of widespread misinformation (i.e., fake news). We then analyze richer models that allow for partisanship, targeted misinformation intended to sway public opinion, and news signals correlated across voters (due to media ownership concentration or censorship). In our experiment, overconfidence severely undermines information aggregation, suggesting that the effect of overconfidence can be much more pronounced at the collective than at the individual level. (JEL C91, D12, D72, D82, D83, L82)

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Section: Large Elections and Extensionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice

Kartal

Tyran

2022

American Economic Review

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“…Loewenstein, Cain and Sah (2011) provide a survey of the findings to that date. Moreover, a small and not yet conclusive experimental literature has recently introduced endogenous conflicts of interest into the analysis of disclosure and analysed the impact of reciprocal elements on advice (Sah and Loewenstein, 2014; Kartal and Tremewan, 2018).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Regulating Markets with Advice: An Experimental Study*

Gottschalk

2020

Oxf Bull Econ Stat

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We present a newly designed market experiment to study regulatory measures in markets with advice inspired by two recently developed theoretical models. In line with our predictions, our experimental markets create conflicts of interest and unsuitable advice biased towards high‐commission products. We examine whether two frequently discussed regulation measures – disclosure and fines for ex post unsuitable advice – reduce commission payments and improve advice. None of the regulation measures result in lower commissions and more suitable advice, however, and advice is equally biased in all treatments. Furthermore, with disclosure, conflicts of interest are enlarged, offsetting the potentially restraining effects of disclosure. The potential impact of various behavioural factors is discussed to encourage further research.

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Disclosing decision makers’ private interests

Moragas¹

2022

European Economic Review

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An offer you can refuse: The effect of transparency with endogenous conflict of interest

Cited by 10 publications

References 31 publications

Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice

Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice

Regulating Markets with Advice: An Experimental Study*

Disclosing decision makers’ private interests

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