Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice

Kartal, Melis; Tyran, Jean‐Robert

doi:10.1257/aer.20201844

Cited by 10 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 56 publications

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“…Another phenomenon often observed in relation to fake news is that although people in general think that the problem of fake news is widespread and pressing, they themselves feel quite confident in their ability to recognize false content from real one. This is in line with a body of research showing that people tend to overestimate their cognitive abilities and that people with the worst abilities tend to be the most vulnerable to believing in online "bullshit" (i.e., meaningless statements) and fake news (Kartal & Tyran, 2022;Littrell & Fugelsang, 2021;Lyons et al, 2021;Pennycook et al, 2017;Serra-Garcia & Gneezy, 2021).…”

Section: Relationship To the Literature And Hypothesessupporting

confidence: 88%

Reasoning versus prior beliefs: The case of COVID‐19 fake news

Čavojová,

Lorko,

Šrol

2024

Applied Cognitive Psychology

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We conduct a survey on a large representative sample of Slovak population to examine the role of analytic thinking, scientific reasoning, conspiracy mentality, and conspiracy beliefs in trust in COVID‐19 fake news and willingness to share it. We find that the ability to distinguish between fake and real news about COVID‐19 is significantly negatively correlated with conspiracy mentality and with beliefs in pandemic‐related conspiracy theories. Analytic thinking is not a significant predictor. Although fake news is generally less likely to be trusted and shared than real news, when fake news is consistent with preexisting opinions, people are more willing to share it compared with belief‐consistent real news. We also find that people are mostly overconfident in their ability to distinguish between fake and real news, and we identify a subpopulation of people that refuse to get vaccinated who trust fake COVID‐19 news significantly more than real news. Thus, consistency with one's beliefs is the best indicator of trust in fake news and willingness to share such news.

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Section: Relationship To the Literature And Hypothesessupporting

confidence: 88%

Reasoning versus prior beliefs: The case of COVID‐19 fake news

Čavojová,

Lorko,

Šrol

2024

Applied Cognitive Psychology

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show abstract

“…This is in line with a body of research showing that people tend to overestimate their cognitive abilities and that people with the worst abilities tend to be the most vulnerable to believing in online "bullshit" (i.e. meaningless statements) and fake news (Kartal & Tyran, 2022;Littrell & Fugelsang, 2021;Lyons et al, 2021;Serra-Garcia & Gneezy, 2021). When people feel overly confident, it may prevent them to slow down and engage in more analytical thinking (Pennycook et al, 2015).…”

Section: Relationship To the Literature And Hypothesessupporting

confidence: 85%

Reasoning vs. prior beliefs: The case of COVID-19 fake news

Cavojova,

Lorko,

Šrol

2023

Preprint

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We survey a large representative sample of the Slovak population to examine the role of analytic thinking, scientific reasoning, conspiracy mentality, and conspiracy beliefs in trust in COVID-19 fake news and willingness to share it. We find that the ability to distinguish between fake and real news about COVID-19 is significantly negatively correlated with conspiracy mentality and with beliefs in pandemic-related conspiracy theories. Analytic thinking is not a significant predictor. Although fake news is generally less likely to be trusted and shared than real news, when fake news is consistent with preexisting opinions, people are more willing to share it compared to belief-consistent real news. We also find that people are mostly overconfident in their ability to distinguish between fake and real news and we identify a sub-population of people that refuse to get vaccinated who trust fake COVID-19 news significantly more than real news. Thus, consistency with one’s beliefs is the best indicator of trust in fake news and willingness to share such news.

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“…Recent research has shown that most people are overconfident in their own ability to spot fake news 25 . The overconfidence in one’s own ability to distinguish true and false information may contribute to spreading fake news 26 . Differences in overconfidence may explain why some groups fall more easily for fake news.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ability of detecting and willingness to share fake news

Arin

Mazrekaj

Thum

2023

Sci Rep

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By conducting large-scale surveys in Germany and the United Kingdom, we investigate the individual-level determinants of the ability to detect fake news and the inclination to share it. We distinguish between deliberate and accidental sharing of fake news. We document that accidental sharing is much more common than deliberate sharing. Furthermore, our results indicate that older, male, high-income, and politically left-leaning respondents better detect fake news. We also find that accidental sharing decreases with age and is more prevalent among right-leaning respondents. Deliberate sharing of fake news is more prevalent among younger respondents in the United Kingdom. Finally, our results imply that respondents have a good assessment of their ability to detect fake news: those we identified as accidental sharers were also more likely to have admitted to having shared fake news.

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Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice

Cited by 10 publications

References 56 publications

Reasoning versus prior beliefs: The case of COVID‐19 fake news

Reasoning versus prior beliefs: The case of COVID‐19 fake news

Reasoning vs. prior beliefs: The case of COVID-19 fake news

Ability of detecting and willingness to share fake news

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