Disclosing decision makers’ private interests

Moragas, Antoni-Italo De

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104282

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…While the implementation of lobbying transparency standards is being discussed across the world and empirical scholars are starting to make use of the available data (You, 2023), a variety of scholars have argued that more policy transparency on actions (Prat, 2005;Fox, 2007) or outcomes (Fox and Van Weelden, 2012;Blumenthal, 2021) or even voters being more intrinsically interested in politics (Prato and Wolton, 2016) can backfire once one accounts for the strategic incentives of politicians. 5 While Sloof (1999) argued that observable campaign contributions facilitate the voters' learning about their incumbent, recent papers have considered the effect of "dark money" campaign contributions on voter learning (Schnakenberg, Schumock, and Turner, 2023) or the effect of forcing the disclosure of a politician's private interest on accountability (De Moragas, 2022). Relatedly, Heo (2024) studies the very incentives of elected officials to disclose policy-relevant information.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The Case for Lobbying Transparency

Zerbini

2023

Preprint

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In response to voters’ demands to reduce interest groups’ influence over policy-making, many countries are passing or discussing transparency regulations on the activities of lobbyists. What is the impact of these laws? To study this question, I combine a lobbying model with a canonical model of political agency. I show that the need for lobbying transparency is rooted in the conflicting policy and electoral incentives of politicians rather than in the risk of undue influence by interest groups per se. Then, by making clearer the process through which a policy was implemented, lobbying transparency both helps voters control the influence of interest groups and better punish politicians who do not represent their best interests. I also show that politicians often have little incentives to implement lobbying transparency, potentially explaining why voters’ demand for it remains unanswered.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The Case for Lobbying Transparency

Zerbini

2023

Preprint

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“…The Chief Digital Transformation Officer (CDTO) is also referred to as the Chief Digital Officer (CDO). CDTO coordinates the development and implementation of the digital transformation strategy of the company's business processes, [9]. Under his leadership, digitalization of the existing IT architecture and business process architecture is carried out.…”

Section: Problem Formulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Selection of Organizational Structure of the Company in the Period of Digital Transformation Using the SCARF Model

2023

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The article is devoted to the problem of selecting the organizational structure of the company during its implementation of digital transformation of business processes. The hypothesis of the study was that consideration of the needs of decision-makers can and should influence the choice of organisational structure changes during the transition to digital transformation of business processes. The decision makers for managing the integration of digital technologies into key aspects of a company's business activities have been shown to be CIOs. Motivational filters that characterize the needs of CIOs according to the SCARF model were presented in a hierarchical combination along with the types of company strategies that can be implemented during the digital transformation of business processes. The SCARF model, the Saaty hierarchy analysis method and the mixed-methods strategy provided the methodological basis for the study. The results demonstrate a justified choice of optimal organizational structure based on the factors of organizational behavior of IT directors and strategic priorities of the company. The presented results can be used to justify the decision to change the organizational structure of the company and to assess the social needs of decision makers.

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“… See Prat (2005),Besley (2007),Fox (2007),Stasavage (2007),Fox and Van Weelden (2012), DeMoragas (2022), andBlumenthal (2023b).8 Interestingly, the extension of Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts (2001) discusses the situation where the incumbent can choose between the two policies one of which conceals the state of the world from the voter. This paper is different because the incumbent's disclosure decision is separate from her policy decision.…”

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confidence: 99%

Discretionary Disclosure, Transparency, and Accountability

Heo

2024

Preprint

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In many instances, politicians have the liberty to conceal politically relevant information from voters due to the absence of legal mandates for disclosure. However, the literature on political transparency has predominantly focused on situations where disclosure mandatesprevent intentional concealment. Using a game-theoretic model, this paper examines how selective disclosure affects an incumbent politician’s incentives and a representative voter’s ability to control and select politicians, in contrast to mandated disclosure. The analysis yields the following insights. First, selective disclosure impairs voter observation, as it allows the incumbent to hide unfavorable information, such as information regarding her misconduct. Second, even when the incumbent can conceal misconduct, the voter can still discipline the incumbent’s behavior because he can infer it from null observation. Interestingly, selective disclosure might be better for the voter than mandated disclosure, especially when he weighs new information more heavily than his prior non-informational preference in his election decision.

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Disclosing decision makers’ private interests

Cited by 3 publications

References 28 publications

The Case for Lobbying Transparency

The Case for Lobbying Transparency

Selection of Organizational Structure of the Company in the Period of Digital Transformation Using the SCARF Model

Discretionary Disclosure, Transparency, and Accountability

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