Discretionary Disclosure, Transparency, and Accountability

Abstract

In many instances, politicians have the liberty to conceal politically relevant information from voters due to the absence of legal mandates for disclosure. However, the literature on political transparency has predominantly focused on situations where disclosure mandatesprevent intentional concealment. Using a game-theoretic model, this paper examines how selective disclosure affects an incumbent politician’s incentives and a representative voter’s ability to control and select politicians, in contrast to mandated disclosure. The analysis yields the following insights. First, selective disclosure impairs voter observation, as it allows the incumbent to hide unfavorable information, such as information regarding her misconduct. Second, even when the incumbent can conceal misconduct, the voter can still discipline the incumbent’s behavior because he can infer it from null observation. Interestingly, selective disclosure might be better for the voter than mandated disclosure, especially when he weighs new information more heavily than his prior non-informational preference in his election decision.