An evolutionary analysis on the effect of government policies on electric vehicle diffusion in complex network

Accelerating the adoption of electric vehicles provides a rare historic opportunity for reducing the dependence on fossil fuel and decarbonising road networks in the field of transport. Many countries have introduced various policy packages on both national and local levels to encourage electric vehicle adoption, but their market shares remain low. For better understanding the reasons behind this evidence, exploring the determinants that influence consumers’ adoption intentions is significant. Previous literature reviews have made clear and elaborated syntheses of influential factors; however, a summary of how evidence can be translated into policy through these factors is lacking. In response, this paper synthesises the main policies of various countries, summarises the previous research results, and forms corresponding policy tools, which can provide a reference to policymakers and guide the policy-making process.

Section: Effective Policy Measures Over Timementioning

confidence: 99%

Are Existing Battery Electric Vehicles Adoption Studies Able to Inform Policy? A Review for Policymakers

Song

Potoglou

2020

“…Encarnação et al [43] applied EGT to investigate the coevolutionary decisions of these multi-participants influenced by different policies and social incentives. Li et al [44] established the EGT model on the complex network and explored the dynamic influences about government policies on the popularization of electric vehicles under various scale networks. The EGT can timely reflect the complicated relationship among the multi-stakeholders, including suppliers, manufacturers and other agents.…”

Section: The Application Of the Evolutionary Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of Multi-Stakeholders’ Behavioral Strategies Considering Public Participation under Carbon Taxes and Subsidies: An Evolutionary Game Approach

Chen

2020

Considering public participation in environmental management, we developed a tripartite game model among governments, manufacturers and publics under carbon taxes and subsidies to investigate whether the mutual relationship between governments and the public can urge manufacturers to adopt low-carbon technology by examining the interaction effect among the multi-stakeholders. In this study, we focus on manufactured products without significant low-carbon peculiarity. For these products, consumers have no way to identify which are from low-carbon production and which are not. The results show that governments and the public have a complementary and coordinating relationship indeed. The regulation cost of governments, the supervision reward for the public and the supervision cost of the public can all influence the behavioral strategies among the multi-stakeholders, including governments, manufacturers and the public. With the regulation cost strengthens dramatically, governments can consider increasing the supervision reward to support the public to participate in the management of manufacturers’ behaviors. Publics should also actively improve their management ability, and the low cost of public participation in supervision is an effective reflection to make up for the lack of government regulation. The implementation of carbon taxes is more advantageous in urging low-carbon manufacturing than government subsidies for low-carbon production. A complete carbon label system can reflect the low-carbon preferences of consumers to help manufacturers integrate low-carbon behavior into their operational decisions.

“…Hirte and Tscharaktschiew [12] conducted an empirical analysis of the German EV market and showed that, in a spatial urban environment, the optimal tax rate depends on the interaction effect of transport-related externalities in taxation and the redistribution effect through the operation of the urban land market and deduced that, in large German cities, EVs should be taxed rather than subsidised. Li et al [13] used firm-level data from the Zhongguancun Science Park to explore the determinants of the development of the NEV industry in China and showed that government subsidies are beneficial for increasing the efficiency of large NEV firms. Yang and Tang [14] established a random coefficient discrete choice model to study the effectiveness and welfare consequences of various subsidy programs of government in Chinese NEV market.…”

Section: Government Subsidy Policy For the Nev Marketmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Other researchers have established evolutionary game models involving auto manufacturers and consumers. Li et al [13] studied the dynamic influence of government policy on EV diffusion in different networks using a complex network evolutionary game method.…”

Section: Application Of Evolutionary Games To Nev Marketsmentioning

confidence: 99%

System Dynamics Model for the Evolutionary Behaviour of Government Enterprises and Consumers in China’s New Energy Vehicle Market

Sun

Wan

2020

Exhaust pollution and energy crises are worsening worldwide. China has become the largest motor vehicle producer; thus, promoting the use of new energy vehicles (NEVs) in China has important practical significance. In this paper, considering the limited rationality of governments, NEV enterprises and consumers, we study the subsidy policy of the China NEV market using the evolutionary game and system dynamics (SD) methods. First, a tripartite evolutionary game model is developed and the replicator dynamics equations and Jacobian matrix are obtained. A SD simulation of the model was conducted to further clarify the impact of the initial market proportion and three variables used in the model. The results show that the initial market proportion affects the evolution speed but does not affect the evolution result when the three group players all choose a mixed strategy. For governments, they should not hastily cancel price subsidies provided to consumers; rather, they should dynamically adjust the rate of the subsidy decrease and increase the consumers' extra cost for purchasing fuel vehicles (FVs). NEV enterprises should appropriately increase their investments in the research and development (R&D) of NEVs.