Analysis of Multi-Stakeholders’ Behavioral Strategies Considering Public Participation under Carbon Taxes and Subsidies: An Evolutionary Game Approach

Abstract

Considering public participation in environmental management, we developed a tripartite game model among governments, manufacturers and publics under carbon taxes and subsidies to investigate whether the mutual relationship between governments and the public can urge manufacturers to adopt low-carbon technology by examining the interaction effect among the multi-stakeholders. In this study, we focus on manufactured products without significant low-carbon peculiarity. For these products, consumers have no way to identify which are from low-carbon production and which are not. The results show that governments and the public have a complementary and coordinating relationship indeed. The regulation cost of governments, the supervision reward for the public and the supervision cost of the public can all influence the behavioral strategies among the multi-stakeholders, including governments, manufacturers and the public. With the regulation cost strengthens dramatically, governments can consider increasing the supervision reward to support the public to participate in the management of manufacturers’ behaviors. Publics should also actively improve their management ability, and the low cost of public participation in supervision is an effective reflection to make up for the lack of government regulation. The implementation of carbon taxes is more advantageous in urging low-carbon manufacturing than government subsidies for low-carbon production. A complete carbon label system can reflect the low-carbon preferences of consumers to help manufacturers integrate low-carbon behavior into their operational decisions.

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Shared Manufacturing Quality Innovation Synergetic Behavior Considering a Subject’s Heterogeneous Emotions

“…To respond to the severe need for carbon emission reduction, China, in 2020, formally proposed the strategic goals of carbon peaking by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060. As a pillar industry of China's national economy, the manufacturing industry occupies an important position in the nation's socio-economic development [2], but it is worth noting that the development strategies of many manufacturing enterprises in China are energy-intensive and highly polluting, and the rapid economic growth they bring is often at the cost of serious environmental pollution and ecological damage [3]. Constantly promoting green and low-carbon innovation in manufacturing [4] and low-carbon manufacturing [5] has become the mainstream trend of the future development of manufacturing.…”

Public Participation in the Social Science: A Systematic Literature Review

“…Other scholars have examined the application of a carbon tax with results showing it is more profitable to promote low-carbon manufacturing than government subsidies for low-carbon reproduction. This shows that the government and society do have a complementary and mutually coordinating relationship (Chen & Hu, 2020).…”

An Evolutionary Game Model to Study Manufacturers and Logistics Companies’ Behavior Strategies for Information Transparency in Cold Chains

“…To study this dilemma and the mutual interactions between the manufacturers and logistics service providers in cold chains, an evolutionary game [4,5] is used to formulate the information transparency mechanisms. We consider the manufacturers and logistics service providers as two populations with dynamic interactions, while the evolutionary game models are capable of studying the dynamics between populations.…”