An Assessment of the Investment Climate in Nigeria

Iarossi, Giuseppe; Mousley, Peter J.; Radwan, Ismail

doi:10.1596/978-0-8213-7797-0

Cited by 15 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Large firms pay higher wages than smaller firms. This is consistent with the observation that labor productivity is higher in large firms in Nigeria than in small firms (Iarossi and Clarke, 2011). Firms with unionized workers and older firms also pay higher wages.…”

Section: Econometric Results From Firm-level Analysissupporting

confidence: 90%

Do Reticent Managers Lie During Firm Surveys?

Clarke

2012

SSRN Journal

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Previous studies have shown that reticent managers, who are identified through a series of random-response questions, answer questions about corruption, firm performance and how honest they are differently from other managers. If reticent managers' answers are different because they are lying, estimates of these behaviors will be inaccurate. But it is also possible that reticent managers answer questions differently because they and their firms are different. This paper presents evidence consistent with the idea that reticent managers lie. First, it shows that reticent managers in Nigeria report that their firms pay higher wages than other firms. This is consistent with previous studies that have found that they also report better performance.Second, it shows that workers at firms with reticent managers report lower, or similar, wages to workers at other firms. The different responses of the managers and the workers suggest that reticent managers are lying. That is, reticent managers in Nigeria report paying higher wages but they are not doing so.

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Section: Econometric Results From Firm-level Analysissupporting

confidence: 90%

Do Reticent Managers Lie During Firm Surveys?

Clarke

2012

SSRN Journal

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“…But many other factors influence the private-sector response. The business climate in Nigeria was still weak in 2009 and in several aspects weaker than in other comparable countries (Iarossi et al, 2009). The most serious bottleneck is the deficient power situation, which causes frequent power cuts.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Did US$18 bn Achieve? The 2005 Debt Relief to Nigeria

Dijkstra¹

2013

Development Policy Review

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Since 2003 Nigeria's economic growth has been consistently above 6% and has been driven by non-oil sectors. This article attempts to assess the contribution of the 2005 debt-relief agreement to this higher growth. The agreement eliminated Nigeria's US$30 billion debt to Paris Club creditors who cancelled US$18 bn, while Nigeria paid back US$12 bn. The article traces the three possible impact channels of debt relief, namely, the flow (reduced debt service), the stock (removal of debt overhang) and the conditionality channel, and comes to the conclusion that the debt-relief agreement played a key role in the country's improved economic performance, in particular through successful conditionality.

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“…An increasing wave of terrorism, a high level of corruption, a high rate of unemployment, inadequate infrastructure, a poor legal system, and the unstable situation in the oilrich Niger Delta region have been features of the country more recently (Bischoff, 2010;Wafure & Nurudeen, 2010). As a consequence, the data set of the ICRG PRA annual rating conducted for Nigeria within the period from 2011 to 2015 reported a very high political risk score (Political Risk Services [PRS] Group, 2015 (Iarossi & Clarke, 2011).…”

Section: Political Risk In Nigeriamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In research conducted by the World Bank on the Investment Climate Assessment Report 2012, it was reported that in 26 states, investors in Nigeria lost 10% of their revenue due to poor infrastructure, crime, corruption, and insecurity. It also reported that 80% of firms offer bribes to government officials for one reason or another (Iarossi & Clarke, 2011).…”

Section: Political Risk In Nigeriamentioning

confidence: 99%

Political risk assessment by multinational corporations in African markets: A Nigerian perspective

Mshelia

Anchor

2018

Thunderbird Intl Bus Rev

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Political risk assessment (PRA) is one of the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the competitiveness of multinational corporations (MNCs), yet little is known about its use in African markets. This study critically investigates the PRA techniques used by MNCs in Nigeria and their applicability. It uses a multimethod approach to analyze data collected from MNCs and the data set of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) PRA annual rating for Nigeria from 2011 to 2015. The findings reveal that most firms use qualitative, rather than quantitative, PRA techniques. Regional variations in the outcome of PRA within Nigeria could also contribute to the low use of quantitative techniques. This article identifies that firms are prepared to invest in Nigeria, in spite of high political risk, due to its economic and financial attractiveness. This article's findings offer some implications for practice with some suggestions on how it could influence firms’ internationalization and their conduct of PRA.

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An Assessment of the Investment Climate in Nigeria

Cited by 15 publications

References 7 publications

Do Reticent Managers Lie During Firm Surveys?

Do Reticent Managers Lie During Firm Surveys?

What Did US$18 bn Achieve? The 2005 Debt Relief to Nigeria

Political risk assessment by multinational corporations in African markets: A Nigerian perspective

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