Ambivalent accommodation: status signalling of a rising India and China's response

Abstract

, Indian President Pranab Mukherjee paid a state visit to China. During his trip, he proposed a 'people-centric partnership' to deepen India's relationship with China. 1 This successful trip is just one of the increasing number of high-level exchanges that have been taking place between India and China as the leaders of both countries try to raise their relationship to a new level. On 23 June 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tashkent. Xi congratulated India on signing the memorandum of obligation to join the SCO and said that China looked forward to enhancing cooperation with India within the SCO framework. 2 However, a few days later, India's bid to enter the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was turned down in Seoul. China, Brazil and some other members reportedly insisted that India sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty before admission was granted. When the news reached India, many Indians were furious with China. 3 They seemed to assume that India would be admitted to the NSG given that it had the publicly expressed support of the US, and they believed that China was the only country that had blocked its entry. 4 According to a senior Chinese diplomat, however, China did not oppose India's entry into the NSG. China was concerned about the criteria for NSG membership and the implications for non-proliferation in a wider context. 5 The Indian government later announced its intention to expel three Chinese journalists from the countryan announcement interpreted by the Global Times, a Chinese nationalist media 1 Srinivasan Ramani, 'Pranab stresses people-centric partnership between India, China', The Hindu, 26 May 2016, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/pranab-at-peking-university/article8649237.ece. (Unless otherwise stated at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 12 Nov. 2016.

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