India’s China strategy under Modi continuity in the management of an asymmetric rivalry

Abstract

India’s strategy toward China under Modi needs to be understood as the approach of a rising power (in Asia) that has been in relative decline vis-à-vis China. Consequently, Modi’s India has adopted a mixed strategy toward its asymmetric rival China that includes accommodation / cooperation at the multilateral level (e.g., the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), competition at the regional level (in the Indo-Pacific), rejection of China’s unilateral initiatives (such as the Belt and Road Initiative), and deterrence (along the Himalayas and in the Indian Ocean). This seemingly inchoate issue-based approach is function of material and ideational factors. In addition to safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity, India aims to prevent Chinese hegemony in Asia while creating strategic space for itself as a great power in a multipolar Asia. However, India lacks a viable strategy to compete/catch-up with China economically, and therefore India’s overall response will be a constant challenge for its diplomacy.

Leadership Styles of Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi: Impact on the Border Issue

“…Moreover, despite both showing dynamic economic growth, India is far behind China in terms of economic development. The Modi administration lacks a viable strategy to economically catch up with China's development, and India also cannot compete with China in almost all human development indexes (Pardesi, 2022;Zhu, 2011). Despite this asymmetry, Modi's diplomacy toward China has become more aggressive in comparison to his predecessors (Ye, 2018;Bajpai, 2018).…”

“…Nevertheless, Modi's foreign policy, despite bringing new energy, still follows the traditional line of Indian foreign affairs. Some scholars believe that Modi's foreign policy is predictable and moderate, while others suppose that no substantial changes could be made by Modi (Ganguly, 2017;Basrur, 2017;Pardesi, 2022). Moreover, scholars even suggest that Modi's China policy shows more "continuity than change" (Madan, 2020: 3), with others viewing India's transformation of 'Look East' into 'Act East' as consistent with the previous government (Pardesi, 2019).…”

“…The recent border clashes, geopolitical rivalry, and their engagement on international platforms demonstrate the negative implications of their competitive confrontation. Accordingly, given that China-India relations are influenced by their historical memories, conflicting interests, and unresolved differences, it is critical to understand the foreign policy approaches of the leaders (Pardesi, 2022).…”

Az átalakuló világrend és az indiai külpolitika Narendra Modi miniszterelnöksége alatt: a stratégiai autonómia és a multialignment koncepciója

“…Az indiai-kínai diplomáciai kapcsolatokban együtt van jelen az együttműködés és a rivalizálás. Az utóbbi aszimmetrikusnak tekinthető, mivel India számára az elsődleges versenytársnak Kína számít, de fordítva ez nem igaz: Pekingnek Washington jelenti a fő kihívást, Újdelhit másodlagos problémaként érzékeli (Pardesi, 2021). Indiában a 2013-ban meghirdetett BRI megerősítette a körbekerítettség percepcióját, hiszen a kelet-ázsiai ország infrastrukturálisnak nevezett beruházásai valamennyi szomszédos államban látványossá tették a kínai jelenlétet.…”

A Chinese Perspective: Will China‐India Friction Paralyze the BRICS?

“…Though the asymmetrical perceptions of power and status continue to shape the trajectories of the relationship, China largely views India’s rise as a positive development (Pu, 2017). Modi’s India has adopted a mixed strategy toward its asymmetric rival China that includes accommodation/cooperation at the multilateral level (Pardesi, 2021). As an institution, BRICS has addressed concerns with power asymmetries from the very beginning by adopting equal voting rights in the NDB decision‐making process.…”