How Status-seeking States Can Cooperate: Explaining India–China Rapprochement After the Doklam Standoff

Abstract

Noticing the gap in the existing literature, this article attempts to argue that status-seeking motives do not necessarily result in zero-sum games and hence tries to summarise conditions for status-seekers to manage conflicts and realise cooperation with one another through creative use of social mobility and creativity strategies. As a case study, this article examines the evolving relations between India and China since 2013 and demonstrates how relations between these two status-seeking states can become confrontational with conflicting status-seeking incentives. For some time, the status competition seemingly dominated their interactions, when India was not willing to accept China’s power status second only to the USA, and China reluctant to recognise India as another rising power with nuclear capabilities. After the Donglang (Doklam) standoff, both governments are finding ways to manage an indirect path for cooperation through a newly discovered multilateral framework. The elements contributing to the stability of their relations lie in their choice of international identity and political calculations in which they can engage with the other based on their shared interests in fostering solidary among developing countries.

Classifying China-India Relationships: Cooperation, Competition and Conflict

“…China and India can collaborate to build a new system replacing the existing one dominated by hegemony (Larsen, 2017). In more favorable circumstances, emerging powers can work together to create new regimes that reflect their common concerns and interests (Nitin & Sita, 2020;Xie, 2019). Economic relations can also be improved by introducing better public services and responsive policy making.…”

La política exterior de India hacia Asia del sur y el océano Índico ante el impacto de la nueva ruta de la seda

“…La relación con China es hoy central dentro de la política exterior india. En palabras de Xie (2019), por un largo período India no ha estado dispuesta a aceptar que China se aproxima a un estatus de superpotencia, detrás de los Estados Unidos; y, por su parte, China es reticente a reconocer que India es otra potencia en ascenso con capacidades nucleares, por lo que esta falta de reconocimiento mutuo genera fricciones y tensiones entre ambos.…”

“…Ante este escenario, el aumento de la influencia china en el subcontinente incrementó la insatisfacción de India llevándola a reacciones de naturaleza más agresiva ya que se siente amenazada en su tradicional esfera de influencia (Xie, 2019). Como potencia emergente, India busca proteger y expandir su influencia en la región del Sur de Asia, el océano Índico y el Sudeste de Asia.…”

“…Una de las primeras objeciones es que pasa por la zona paquistaní ocupada de Cachemira, área en disputa sobre la cual India reclama su soberanía. Por esta razón India boicoteó la Cumbre sobre la Nueva Ruta de la Seda llevada a cabo en mayo de 2017 en Pekín (Xie, 2019).…”

Capturing the Growth of Chinese Investment in India

“…Many scholars across the region view Chinese investment with doubt since a long time. They argue that China’s rise or economic expansion will translate into outright expansionism or a quest for strategic dominance (Xie, 2019). The major Southeast Asian nations resist strategic alignment with China.…”