“…As Naczyk (: 442) put it bluntly in his analysis on the rise of pension funds in Belgium and France, ‘Since they sell products that may directly compete with public social insurance, financial firms – especially insurance companies – can be expected to be a key proponent of retrenchment in public/statutory pensions and their concomitant partial privatization’. It is to be highlighted that the market‐oriented explanation also points to the role of strong states as the creation of pension and financial markets needs governments which are able to implement liberalizing reforms (sometimes against the vested interests of groups benefitting from state‐run or employer‐led schemes; on which, see Naczyk ; Hyde and Borzutzky ). In addition, powerful financial companies and the influence of international organizations such as the IMF can be viewed as the two requisite scope conditions making the lobbying efforts of finance effective.…”
Section: The Finance‐pension Nexus: Market‐oriented Versus State‐centmentioning
This study analyses the decision-making processes that led to the introduction of the New Zealand Superannuation Fund (a public pension reserve and investment fund), as well as the KiwiSaver Scheme, which is New Zealand's first soft-compulsory private pension scheme. Why and how are governments engaged in the development of funded pensions? These are the questions this study addresses. In analyzing the finance-pension nexus in New Zealand, this article adopts a statecentric approach. It argues that pension funding reforms are shaped by state officials who pursue their own motives because policymakers frame funded pensions as an instrument for achieving broader fiscal, economic and financial policy outcomes. Because New Zealand is a typical case of a state-centric explanation, a study of its pension funding reforms helps in finding causal links between finance and pensions.
“…As Naczyk (: 442) put it bluntly in his analysis on the rise of pension funds in Belgium and France, ‘Since they sell products that may directly compete with public social insurance, financial firms – especially insurance companies – can be expected to be a key proponent of retrenchment in public/statutory pensions and their concomitant partial privatization’. It is to be highlighted that the market‐oriented explanation also points to the role of strong states as the creation of pension and financial markets needs governments which are able to implement liberalizing reforms (sometimes against the vested interests of groups benefitting from state‐run or employer‐led schemes; on which, see Naczyk ; Hyde and Borzutzky ). In addition, powerful financial companies and the influence of international organizations such as the IMF can be viewed as the two requisite scope conditions making the lobbying efforts of finance effective.…”
Section: The Finance‐pension Nexus: Market‐oriented Versus State‐centmentioning
This study analyses the decision-making processes that led to the introduction of the New Zealand Superannuation Fund (a public pension reserve and investment fund), as well as the KiwiSaver Scheme, which is New Zealand's first soft-compulsory private pension scheme. Why and how are governments engaged in the development of funded pensions? These are the questions this study addresses. In analyzing the finance-pension nexus in New Zealand, this article adopts a statecentric approach. It argues that pension funding reforms are shaped by state officials who pursue their own motives because policymakers frame funded pensions as an instrument for achieving broader fiscal, economic and financial policy outcomes. Because New Zealand is a typical case of a state-centric explanation, a study of its pension funding reforms helps in finding causal links between finance and pensions.
“…The other group of domestic actors most strongly supporting private accounts was the financial industry. Insurance companies, banks, or stock exchanges were indeed clear winners of pension privatization since they were to be the main providers of private pension products (Kemmerling and Neugart ; Leimgruber ; Naczyk ).…”
Section: Pension Privatization's Contribution To Economic Growth Tramentioning
Since the global financial crisis, those East European countries that had partly privatized their pension systems in the 1990s or early 2000s increasingly scaled back their mandatory private retirement accounts and restored the role of public provision. What explains this wave of reversals in pension privatization and variation in its outcomes? Proponents of pension privatization had argued that it would boost domestic capital markets and economic growth. By revealing how pension privatization helped increase sovereign debt and how large a part of pension funds' assets was invested in government bonds, the crisis strengthened the position of domestic opponents of mandatory private accounts. But these actors' capacity and determination to reverse pension privatization depended on the level of their country's public debt and on pension funds' portfolio structure. Empirically, the argument is supported with case studies of Hungarian, Polish, and Slovak pension reform.
“…Desde la crisis del estado de bienestar en la Europa continental, expresada en la privatización de servicios de seguridad social como las pensiones (Naczyk 2012), hasta las luchas sociales contra la privatización de los recursos hídricos en Bolivia (Sanz 2006;Spronk 2007), pasando por la participación de agentes estatales corruptos en procesos de privatización en el norte de África (Hibou 2013), se evidencia el ascenso de agentes privados.…”
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