Against Logical Form

Johnson‐Laird, P. N.

doi:10.5334/pb-50-3-4-193

Cited by 64 publications

(48 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…Even simple deductive tasks often yield low performances [2]. This would probably happen because the human mind does not seem to work according to the rules of logic [3]. The psychological processing of deduction, in contrast, would proceed by representing mental simulations inferred from given information [1].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Shallow Processing of Logical Negation

Macbeth¹

2013

PBS

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Abstract:The aim of this study is to introduce a novel reasoning phenomenon concerned with the shallow processing of negation in the context of sentential reasoning. By analogy to other psychological explanations that account for superficial responses with conditionals, this study proposes an account for biconditionals derived from a recent theory of negation. This theory predicts that the psychological use of negation returns small scope products. This would happen because the human mind tends to avoid the working memory overload by simplifying its reasoning processes. A within-subjects experimental design was applied to test this conjecture. Results were consistent with such small scope negation prediction. The obtained evidence extends the observation of shallow reasoning processes to the negation of conjunctions and disjunctions that take the form of biconditionals. The results of this study support a mental models approach to account for the psychology of logical negation.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Shallow Processing of Logical Negation

Macbeth¹

2013

PBS

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“…Finally, Johnson-Laird et al (2015) insist in other problem already raised in papers such as that of Johnson-Laird (2010). That problem is the one of logical forms and has to do with the fact that the formal theories also need to explain how the logical forms of the expressions in natural language are recovered, since how the process could be is unclear.…”

Section: Four Problems For the Syntactic Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Essentially Syntactic and Formal Theory Is Still Possible

Astorga

2017

Pragmalinguistica

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ABSTRACT:In 2015, JohnsonLaird, Khemlani, and Goodwin indicated four reasons why a basically syntactic approach explaining the human inferential activity is hard to accept nowadays. However, in this paper, I try to show that such reasons do not reveal real problems for the syntactic frameworks, and that most of the difficulties related to them have already been addressed by the literature on cognitive science and considered to be clearly surmountable from a mainly formal perspective. In this way, I argue that it is still possible to claim that syntax plays an important role in human thought. RESUMEN:En 2015, JohnsonLaird, Khemlani y Goodwin plantearon cuatro razones por las que, en nuestros días, es complejo aceptar un enfoque básicamente sintáctico para explicar la actividad inferencial humana. No obstante, en este trabajo, intento mostrar que tales razones no revelan problemas reales en los marcos sintácticos y que la mayoría de las dificultades relacionadas con ellas ya han sido analizadas en la literatura de la ciencia cognitiva y consideradas como claramente superables desde una perspectiva principalmente formal. De este modo, argumento que todavía es posible defender que la sintaxis desempeña un rol importante en el pensamiento humano. RÉSUMÉ:En 2015, JohnsonLaird, Khemlani et Goodwin ont indiqué quatre raisons pour les quelles une approche essentiellement syntaxique expliquant l'activité inférentielle humaine est difficile à accepter de nos jours. Cependant, dans cet article, j'essaie de montrer que de telles raisons ne révèlent pas de problèmes réels pour les cadres syntaxiques et que la plupart des difficultés qui les concernent ont déjà été abordées dans la littérature sur les sciences cognitives et considérées comme clairement surmontables à partir d'une perspective essentiellement formelle. De cette façon, je soutiens qu'il est encore possible de prétendre que la syntaxe joue un rôle important dans la pensée humaine.

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“…As shown by the literature on it, which is very large (just some examples of works about this theory are Johnson-Laird, 2004, 2006, 2010, 2012Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, & Goodwin, 2015a, 2015bKhemlani, Orenes, & Johnson-Laird, 2012, 2014Oakhill & Garnham, 1996;Ragni, Sonntag, & Johnson-Laird, 2016), MMT can properly explain many cognitive facts that other approaches cannot. However, Baratgin et al (2015) have raised some criticisms with regard to the way it deals with disjunction.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, it cannot be ignored that it has a very strong philosophical basis coming from authors such as Peirce (1931Peirce ( -1958. Indeed, the concept of iconicity is very relevant for MMT (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2012, p. 136) because one of its main ideas is that people do not usually relate sentences in natural language to logical forms or well-formed formulae in standard logic (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2010), but to mental representations that reproduce different possibilities in reality. Those representations are named 'models', and the theory considers each connective joining clauses (e.g., the conditional, conjunction, disjunction,…) to have, in ideal circumstances, a set of 'Fully Explicit Models'.…”

Section: Mmt Peirce and Disjunctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Possibilities of Disjunction in the Mental Models Theory

Astorga

2018

prometeica

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Baratgin and colleagues have questioned certain aspects of the mental models theory related to disjunction. It is truth that, from this last theory, the paper authored by Baratgin et al. (2015) has already been responded. However, I try to further develop that response here by insisting in two important points of the theory: the role that modulation plays in it and the clear differences between its framework and standard logic. In this way, my main aim is to support to a larger extent, by means of theoretical arguments based on its general approach, the idea that the objections presented in the mentioned paper do not really impact the mental models theory.Keywords: disjunction; mental models; modulation RESUMEN Baratgin y sus colaboradores han cuestionado ciertos aspectos de la teoría de los modelos mentales relativos a la disyunción. Es cierto que, desde esta última teoría, el trabajo de Baratgin et al. (2015) ya ha sido respondido. No obstante, aquí se trata de desarrollar en mayor medida tal respuesta insistiendo en dos puntos importantes de la teoría: el rol que la modulación desempeña en su seno y las claras diferencias que existen entre su marco y la lógica estándar. En este sentido, el objetivo principal es apoyar aún más, por medio de argumentos teóricos basados en su enfoque general, la idea de que las objeciones presentadas en el trabajo mencionado no tienen un impacto real en la teoría de los modelos mentales.

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Against Logical Form

Cited by 64 publications

References 55 publications

The Shallow Processing of Logical Negation

The Shallow Processing of Logical Negation

An Essentially Syntactic and Formal Theory Is Still Possible

The Possibilities of Disjunction in the Mental Models Theory

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